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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Securities Code Project of the American Law Institute attempts to integrate into one piece of legislation the various
provisions of the seven separate statutes under which the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) exercises its supervisory and advisory responsibilities. This task, under the extraordinary leadership of Professor Louis Loss, succeeds in eliminating from the statutes unnecessary, duplicative, and needlessly complex provisions and in clarifying confused and unsettled areas of
securities regulation.
The policy of full, accurate, and continuous disclosure to investors embodied in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)' and in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 2 continues unfettered
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., Duke University, 1964; J.D., Vanderbilt
University, 1967; LL.M., Harvard University, 1968; Member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1-26 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act], 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1970).
2. Securities Act of 1934 §§ 1-34 [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh

(1970).
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under the proposed Federal Securities Code (the Code), but the
provisions effecting that policy are consolidated and simplified.
Under the Code, a company must register itself (not its securities)
with the Commission after the first year-end at which it has at least
one million dollars in total assets and three hundred holders of its
aggregate, nonexempted securities3 or when the Code first requires
it to file an offering statement. All reports and other filings thereafter are keyed to that registration, creating a single disclosure file
at the SEC. A company generally must file an offering statement
containing a prospectus for each distribution of its securities by any
person (whether the company, a controlling person, or a noncontrolling person) .4The offering statement thus replaces the registration statement currently required to be filed under the 1933 Act.
Further disclosure is achieved through the filing of periodic reports
and proxy statements.5
While seeking to further investor protection by requiring disclosure through its filing and registration provisions, the Code also
attempts to avoid unnecessary regulation of and interference with
holiest business or with the process of private capital formation.
When such interference is unnecessary or serves only minimal public interest, the Code, through exceptions and exemptions, permits
companies to avoid filing and registration requirements. This article
focuses upon these Code exceptions and exemptions 7 which do not
3. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 401, 402 (Reporter's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. I3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as RD 1-3]. This company registration requirement parallels §
12(g) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970), except that the number that triggers registration is 300 holders rather than 500 holders and that, in determining that number, the holders
of all nonexempt securities are counted instead of only the holders of each separate class of
equity securities. See generally Bialkin, The Issuer Registrationand DistributionProvisions
of the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAD. L. REv. 327 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Bialkin].
4. RD 1-3 § 501. Under the 1933 Act secondary sales do not ordinarily create registration
problems unless the seller is a controlling person of the issuer. The Code abandons the
distinction between secondary distributions by a controlling person and those by a noncontrolling person, treating all distributions alike and requiring the filing of offering statements
unless the particular transaction or security is exempted. While only an issuer may file an
offering statement, the Code permits a secondary distributor who is unable to meet the
conditions of an exemption to file with the SEC a distribution statement in lieu of an issuerfiled offering statement if the issuer continuously has been a registrant for one year. Even
when the issuer is not a one-year registrant, a secondary distributor may require that an issuer
file an offering statement upon demand and payment of expenses. See Bialkin, supra note 3,
at 350.
5. RD 1-3 §§ 601, 602.
6. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 101 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977). These purposes are consistent
with those evidenced by the legislative history of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
7. A company may escape filing its initial registration only by avoiding a nonexempted
distribution or the triggering levels of total assets and of holders of its nonexempt securities.
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eliminate the necessity for compliance with the Code's antifraud
provisions and with any applicable state blue sky laws, subjects
beyond the scope of this article.
Most of the exempted securities and transactions discussed in
this article apply only to special types of issuers, securities, and
transactions. The Code does contain, however, certain exceptions
and exempted transactions that have general application for most
issuers and selling stockholders. A chart appearing at the end of
this Article sets forth in a simplistic fashion the principal features
of the exceptions and exemptions which most often will be relied
upon by issuers and secondary sellers in selling securities.
II.

THE DISTRIBUTION CONCEPT

Since an offering statement must be filed only when a distribution occurs, giving content to the concept of distribution is one of
the most important tasks of the Code. Section 227 defines distribution as "an offering other than a limited offering or a trading transaction." The limited offering exception is derived from the exemption in section 4(2) of the 1933 Act for nonpublic, or private, offerings. The trading transaction exception is derived from the exemptions provided for routine secondary trading transactions in sections
4(1) and 4(4) of the 1933 Act. Although not cast as specific exemptive provisions, these two exceptions provide essential avenues of
escape from filing and registration requirements.
A.

The Limited Offering
(1)

The Current Law

Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, the precedent for the limited offering exception, exempts from the registration provisions of that Act
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." This
exemption has caused considerable turmoil and confusion. The 1933
Act does not define the term "public offering," and its legislative
history fails to identify the necessary components of an exempt
nonpublic, or private, offering. For many years lawyers relied upon
While this article is generally concerned with the available escape chutes from the offering
statement filing and delivery requirements, the discussions relating to the distribution concept, to the local distribution, and to exempt securities and transactions are equally applicable to the initial company registration statement requirement, assuming that the triggering
levels of assets and security holders have not been reached. Section 405 of the Code permits
a registrant to terminate its registration when the number of holders of all its securities falls
below 100 at a fiscal year-end.
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the general guidelines provided by an early SEC release,8 which
focused upon the following considerations: (a) the number of offerees (a maximum of twenty-five persons was suggested); (b) the relationship of the offerees to one another; (c) the relationship of the
offerees to the issuer; (d) the number of units offered; and (e) the
size and manner of the offering. Within the parameters of these
guidelines, the bar for many years focused primarily upon the number of offerees in determining whether an offering was exempt as a
private offering. In 1953, however, the Supreme Court in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co.," its only decision construing the exemption,
stated that the focus should be primarily upon the offerees' need for
the protection afforded by registration under the 1933 Act rather
than upon the number of offerees. The Court indicated that if offerees can "fend for themselves" and have access to the type of information that a registration statement would disclose, then the offering is nonpublic and, therefore, exempt.
Prompted by increasing reliance upon the exemption for sales
of speculative issues to small numbers of unrelated and uninformed
persons, the Commission in 1962 issued another release again emphasizing the need to consider all the elements set forth in its previous release and noting that, consistent with Ralston Purina,the
number of offerees is relevant "only to the question of whether they
have the requisite association with and knowledge of the issuer
which make the exemption available." 10 Despite the warnings contained in the 1962 release and in Ralston Purina,many practitioners
continued to rely primarily upon a numbers test and generally were
frustrated in trying to determine the relative importance of the
other considerations. A series of federal circuit court decisions
added to the confusion." Some of the decisions, if read literally,
seemed to challenge many transactions that historically had been
viewed as good "private placements." These opinions stressed the
need to prove that all offerees, even if sophisticated and limited in
8. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
2740.
9. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1972), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
2770.
11. Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,844 (5th Cir. 1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on
othergrounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972); Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v.
American Int'l Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d
631 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
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number,' 2 had access to the information a registration statement
would provide. One opinion seemed to say that the requisite access
could be established only by proof that the offerees had some special
or privileged relationship, tantamount to the position of an
"insider," with the issuer and between or among themselves.'3 Even
the most sophisticated members of the securities bar were disturbed
by the decisions' implications, which raised doubts about the availability of the section 4(2) exemption for many venture capital situations and for traditional institutional purchases."
The uncertainties surrounding the necessary components of an
exempt private offering resulted in considerable pressure upon the
Commission to adopt an objective rule. In 1974 the Commission
adopted rule 146 under the 1933 Act setting forth a number of conditions which, if met, qualify an offering for the section 4(2) exemption.'5 The rule sets forth specific standards designed to determine
objectively the ability of offerees and purchasers to fend for themselves, specific requirements to ensure offerees' access to information, restrictions limiting the manner of offering and specifying
thirty-five as the maximum number of purchasers, and certain requirements designed to control transferability. Although the bar
welcomed the Commission's attempt to provide objective standards, the rule's meticulous paperwork requirements, which pose
one of several practical problems in satisfying all of the specified
conditions, and its failure to recognize the distinctly different types
of offerings involved in private placement situations have resulted
12. The private offering exemption may not be available even if it is proved that there
are only a small number of sophisticated offerees. In Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,844 (5th Cir. 1977), the defendant proved that the
offering was made only to eight persons, all of whom were sophisticated investors and only
five of whom actually purchased in the offering. The failure to prove that each offeree had
access to or had been furnished information that a registration statement would disclose
caused the court to conclude that the offering was not an exempt private placement.
13. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 160 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Doran
v. Petroleum Management Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,844 (5th Cir.
1977).
14. The failure of judicial decisions and administrative interpretations to recognize the
practical distinctions between the various types of private placements, which range from the
speculative venture capital situation to the blue chip institutional debt private placement in
which access in terms of a preexisting relationship rarely exists, and the heavy burden of proof
placed upon an issuer claiming the private placement exemption caused great concern among
members of the securities bar. See generally Rediker, The Fifth Circuit Cracks Down on NotSo-Private Offerings, 25 ALA. L. REv. 289 (1973); Analysis, The DisappearingPrivate Offering
Exemption?, 144 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) B-1 (March 22, 1972).
15. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146, 1 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 2710.
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in dissatisfaction with and limited use of the rule. 6 These considerato reevaluate rule
tions, among others, have caused the Commission
17
rescission.
its
contemplate
to
146 and
Rule 146 is not an exclusive rule and, because of the difficulty
and impracticality of applying it in many situations, many issuers
continue to rely upon the residual law surrounding the statutory
exemption. The desire for greater uniformity and certainty in the
residual law prompted the organized bar to publish position papers
setting forth applicable criteria for determining the availability of
the section 4(2) exemption. The papers emphasize that application
of standards to an-institutional offering should vary in some respects
from their application to promotional offerings to individuals of
speculative securities. 8 Generally the characteristics set forth in
these papers of a valid private offering are as follows: (a) offeree
qualification, which may be based upon sophistication, wealth, or
personal relationship; (b) access to or actual receipt of information,
which may be less extensive than a registration statement (access
resulting from economic bargaining power is included specifically);
(c) a limited manner of offering; and (d)the absence of redistribution. The papers, while of uncertain authority, are significant, particular in light of the possible rescission of rule 146.
In addition to the problem of determining the components necessary for a valid private offering under the section 4(2) exemption,
the exemption is limited by its statutory language to issuers. Nevertheless, persons other than issuers'" seek to avoid the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act by making private sales that would
16. Rule 146 appears to be used primarily for offerings of special types of securities, such
as limited partnership interests, in which the practicalities and costs of complying with
rigorous conditions are not insurmountable. The rule is rarely relied upon for institutional
and venture capital transactions. Indeed the rule appears to have operated in a harmful
fashion for the raising of venture capital for small businesses. See generally Kripke, SEC Rule
146: A "MajorBlunder," 172 N.Y.L.J. 1 (July 5, 1974); Note, SEC Rules 144 and 146: Private
Placementsfor the Few, 59 VA. L. REv. 886 (1973).
17. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5779 (Dec. 6, 1976) [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,820. The Commission in this release recognizes the criticism that rule 146 hinders
the obtaining of investment venture capital. The Commission further indicates its concern
that the rule is being used fraudulently, particularly with respect to oil and gas tax shelter
offerings. The Commission has requested comments on whether the rule should be rescinded,
revised, or retained.
18. Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar Ass'n, Section 4(2) and
Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAw. 485 (1975); Committee on Developments in Business Financing,
American Bar Ass'n, InstitutionalPrivate Placements Under the Section 4(2) Exemption of
the Securities Act of 1933, 31 Bus. LAw. 515 (1975).
19. Generally, these persons are either in a control relationship with an issuer or purchasers of privately-placed securities from the issuer.
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meet the requirements of section 4(2) if made by an issuer. Technically these sellers must rely upon the section 4(1) exemption, but
because they must structure the transactions in a manner similar
to private placements by issuers under section 4(2) in order to secure
the section 4(1) exemption," the exemption is known as the section
4(1-1/2) exemption. Whether the conditions required for a section
4(2) exemption must be met to establish a valid section 4(1-1/2)
exemption is unclear, and practitioners often must rely merely upon
their intuitive understanding of the area.
Public resales by purchasers of securities in transactions meeting all of the conditions of the section 4(2) or section 4(1-1/2) exemptions pose still another problem. Implicit in the private offering
concept is the requirement that purchasers' resales be restricted in
order that the private offering does not become a public one by
immediate distribution of the securities to the public. In addition,
since the section 4(2) and 4(1-1/2) exemptions apply only to single
transactions, any subsequent sale by the purchaser must find its
own exemption. The section 4(1) exemption ordinarily is relied
upon to permit public resales, its availability depending upon
whether the security was acquired "with a view to" its distribution. 2' Thus purchasers in private placements customarily represent that they are buying for investment and not with a view to
distribution. In advising such purchasers of the permissible times
and manner for resale of their securities, attorneys struggled for
many years with the ad hoc application of fuzzy concepts, such
as "investment intent, ' 22 "change in circumstances, ' ' 23 and
20. Section 4(1) exempts transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970). To avoid being classified as an underwriter as defined
by § 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11), a person must not be selling in connection
with a distribution and must carefully plan resales of privately-placed securities to ensure
that a public distribution does not occur. See generally Schnieder, Comment Letter on Rule
146, 228 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-1 (Nov. 21, 1973).
21. The definition of "underwriter" in § 2(11) of the 1933 Act includes a person who
has purchased from an issuer (including a controlling person) with a view to the distribution
of any security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970). A person who has purchased with such a view
becomes an underwriter and is precluded from relying upon the § 4(1) exemption. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(1) (1970).
22. A person buying with investment intent presumably could not have bought with a
view to a distribution. Since it was very difficult objectively to prove investment intent, a
presumption of investment intent arose if the buyer held the securities for more than a certain
period of time, which ranged from two to five years depending on when and with whom one
discussed the point. See SEC PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND INUNDERWRITINGS
25-43 (Israels ed. 1962); Kennedy, The Case of the Scarlett Letter, 23 Bus. LAW. 23 (1967).

23. The "change in circumstances" doctrine was developed by the staff to shorten the
holding period requirements when the buyer experienced a change of circumstances that
generated a need to resell privately-placed securities that was not present at the time of the
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"fungibility, ' 2 each of which contributed to inconsistency in legal

advice rendered. Rule 144, adopted under the 1933 Act by the Commission in 1972, largely resolved the problem by requiring public
resales of most securities purchased either in a nonpublic offering
from an issuer or in a chain of such offerings to be made in accordance with the rule. In general, the rule permits limited resales in
ordinary brokerage transactions after a two-year holding period.2 1
(2)

The Code Approach

Recognizing the problems surrounding the private placement
exemption under current law and the need to relieve small businesses of the burdens of registration when the public interest in
registration is negligible, the Code substantially changes the subjective concepts underlying the section 4(2) exemption.26 Code section
227(b) sets forth at least four categories of conditions that must be
met in order to qualify for the limited offering exception.
1. Number and Characterof Purchasers.An offering 7 must
not result in sales to more than thirty-five noninstitutional persons, 28 although sales are permitted to an unlimited number of institutional investors. 9 No limitation is imposed on the number of offerees, nor must the purchasers be sophisticated, wealthy, or closely
purchase. A resale by such a person would not conflict with the required investment intent
at the time of the original purchase.
24. The staff traditionally applied a fungibility concept when a person owned privatelyplaced securities as well as securities purchased in the market. The staff considered these
shares to be fungible and deemed the shares first offered after the private placement as the
restricted shares subject to the holding period irrespective of the source of the specific shares
delivered. See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
25. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,487. In the staff's view, the old rules relating to the resales
apply only to privately-placed securities acquired before April 15, 1972, even though rule 144
is stated to be non-exclusive.
26. As the Reporter, Professor Loss, has stated, the rationale behind the concept is a
matter of husbanding resources and balancing federal power in view of the fact that on the
one hand the Commission's manpower and budget are limited and on the other hand there
are other protective devices such as the state blue sky laws. See generally Loss, The "Limited
Offering" Under the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, PLI. 4th Annual
Institute on Securities Regulation 35 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Loss, Limited Offerings].
27. The definition of "offering" in section 267 of the Code requires a person relying upon
the limited offering exception to examine all prior offerings to see if they must be integrated.
See notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text.
28. Under section 276 of the Code a corporation, partnership, association, trust, or
organized group of persons is apparently considered one person even if specifically formed for
a particular limited offering. The number 35 has no magical significance; it originated from
an indication by SEC Commissioner Phil Loomis that the Commission would accept the
number 35. See Loss, Limited Offerings, supranote 26, at 41.
29. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
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related to each other or to the issuer. The purchasers need not have
access to or be furnished with information comparable to that provided by registration. Thus the Code significantly modifies existing
interpretations of the section 4(2) exemption, relieving issuers from
difficult problems of proof in establishing the private placement
exemption.
The Code comments suggest that departure from the existing
emphasis upon the number of offerees is justifiable because the
breadth of the definition of "offer" causes difficulty in counting
offerees and because nonpurchasing offerees suffer no injury." Although sound policy dictates removal of the practical burdens
caused by the present emphasis upon the number of offerees, restraints should be placed upon the breadth of the offering. Unlimited offers may lead to presale stimulation of interest sufficient to
affect existing markets, to condition the market for later offerings,
or to mislead ultimate purchasers. The Code deals with this problem, not as a condition of the limited offering exception, but through
a separate section prohibiting anyone from engaging in "general
advertising" in connection with a limited offering in contravention
of Commission rules.3 ' Presumably the Commission promptly will
adopt rules to protect the public from any potential harm arising
from broad advertising in connection with a limited offering. The
Code's prohibition, however, is limited to "advertising," a term that
may not be broad enough to enable the Commission to block harmful general solicitation that technically is not advertising. In addition, since the restriction on general advertising is not a condition
of the limited offering exception, the Code lacks the effectiveness it
would have if a seller were faced with civil liability for violations.
Although the Code's focus on the number of purchasers, rather than
upon the number of offerees, is well-founded, the ramifications of
the change would be better controlled by including as a condition
to the limited offering exception a prohibition against general solicitation in addition to the ban on advertising and by providing objec2
tive definitions for these terms by Commission rule.
Another major departure from the private placement concept
of the 1933 Act is the rejection of Ralston Purinathrough the aban30. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 227, Comment (2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as TD-1].
31. RD 1-3 § 502(b). Additional restraints upon the misuse of unlimited offers are found
in the Code's general antifraud and antimanipulative provisions.
32. Precedents for this approach to the problem may be found in rule 146(c). This
approach to imposing limitations on the manner of offering has resulted in few problems.
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donment of the "sophistication" and "relationship" tests used by
both rule 146 and the residual law of section 4(2) to determine
qualified offerees and purchasers. Under the Code's approach, the
purchasers of a limited offering can be thirty-five widows and orphans who are thoroughly unsophisticated strangers, and who are
unable to bear the economic risk of their investment. By focusing
solely upon numbers, the Code adds precision to a subjective and
troublesome aspect of the section 4(2) exemption, but places the
entire burden of investor protection upon its antifraud provisions
and upon applicable state blue sky laws. Such provisions may not
adequately protect investors in the private placement process, particularly in the context of speculative offerings by unseasoned companies. The Code also abolishes the requirement that purchasers be
furnished with or have access to information about their investments. The difficulty of proving a fraud claim based, as often is the
case, upon oral statements and the practical limitations on the
budgets and enforcement personnel of the regulatory authorities
limit the effectiveness of antifraud provisions and substantive blue
sky regulation in providing comprehensive protection of the investing public. As a practical matter, an individual purchaser is better
protected if the sale to him destroys the availability of the limited
offering exception and thereby subjects the seller to civil liability
without the problems of proof involved in an antifraud claim. As a
policy matter Congress must decide whether the certainty achieved
by the Code's present approach benefits the private capital formation process sufficiently to outweigh the increased likelihood that
the savings of naive, uninformed individuals will be tapped by
capital-seeking promoters and issuers.
The Code definition of "institutional investors," who are excluded from the restriction on the number of purchasers of a limited
offering further clouds the issue relating to the imposition of some
minimum self-fending or informational standards for individual
purchasers. Section 242 defines institutional investors as including
only banks, insurance companies, and registered investment companies, but the Commission by rule may add other types of institutions, such as universities or pension funds, or may remove certain
types of banks, insurance companies, or investment companies. Any
Commission rule including or excluding an institution from this
definition must be based upon such self-fending considerations as
financial sophistication, net worth, and amount of assets under
management. Thus although the Code suggests that it is important
for the Commission to consider the sophistication and financial
ability of institutions to fend for themselves, these considerations
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are immaterial to individuals participating in a limited offering.
The unobstructed access to all private capital provided by the
Code's limited offering exception should be restricted when the issuer is not a one-year registrant and has a weak or no financial
history.3 3 In this situation, purchasers should be limited to those
with such financial sophistication, net worth, or preexisting family
34
or business relationship as the Commission shall prescribe by rule.
Although the Commission has the power under section 227(b)(3) to
add this condition to the limited offering exception, the Code, in
order to assure that action is taken, should direct the SEC to promulgate a rule based upon specific criteria.
2. Resale Restrictions. The second condition to the limited
offering exception places restrictions on resales to prevent the limited offering from becoming a broad public offering. Although such
restrictions are essential to the concept of a nonpublic offering under
the 1933 Act, the Code's approach is significantly different. Under
the Code, unless resales are made pursuant to a filed offering or
distribution statement or pursuant to an exemption,35 no resales
may be made that result at any one time in more than thirty-five
owners of the securities sold in the limited offering, excluding institutional investors and those who became owners by means other
than purchase. This resale restriction applies for three years following the last sale to any of the initial noninstitutional buyers, except
that the restrictive period is one year when the issuer is a one-year
registrant at the time of a particular resale. 6 Thus there is no hold33. In view of the other exemptions available to small businesses, particularly the
$100,000 small offering and the local distribution exemptions, this limitation is not likely to
interfere unduly with the raising of private capital, except when the public interest is intensified by the need to raise large amounts of capital from investors located in several states.
34. If a self-fending condition is added to the limited offering exception, it is assumed
that § 227(b)(7) would protect an issuer or reseller who in good faith believes that the
purchaser met the qualifications imposed by the Commission's rule. If such a good faith bar
to civil liability is included, the inclusion of this additional condition should not cause great
concern. Moreover, if this type of self-fending condition is imposed, relatively few additional
benefits would result from including a similar condition requiring the furnishing of or access
to information. An information requirement presumably already exists in the Code's antifraud provisions.
35. See RD 1-3 § 227, Note 1(c). The specific references to resales during the restrictive
period pursuant to a distribution statement conflict squarely with § 509(a) (3), which bars the
use of a distribution statement for sales of limited offering securities during the restrictive
period. See note 57 infra and accompanying text. Similarly, unless the Commission adds a
useful exemption under its general authority contained in § 302, few if any exemptions are
available for resales during the restrictive period. See note 37 infra.
36. A one-year registrant is defined as a company that has registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and'has been continuously a registrant for one year. RD 1-3 § 270.
Operating upon a philosophy of continuous disclosure, the Code in a number of instances
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ing period requirement per se, and the abstruse concept of investment intent is irrelevant. Resales may be made immediately and
frequently during the applicable restrictive period if the maximum
number of owners does not exceed thirty-five. 7 Moreover, the Code
eliminates the confusion surrounding the tacking of holding periods
in nonsale situations such as pledges or transfers by gift or death.
The Code does not count recipients of these transfers in determining
whether the maximum number of owners has been reached.
The new approach to the resale problem, although welcome,
poses practical difficulties for a reseller in determining when the
restrictive period begins and ends and whether thirty-five or fewer
owners, other than institutions or recipients of securities in nonsale
transactions, are involved. The latter problem is particularly complex because the term "owner" rather than "person" is used and
because the term includes indirect as well as direct ownership,"
thus requiring an issuer or reseller to ferret out the number of beneficial, indirect owners when the record owner is a nominee, partnership, or similar entity. Section 227(b)(7) of the Code remedies this
problem by protecting a reseller from civil liability if that person
acts in good faith reliance upon a statement by either the issuer or
its transfer agent setting forth the number and institutional nature
of the current owners. The Code similarly protects a reseller who in
good faith receives from his buyer a written undertaking designed
to avoid an illegal distribution and complies with any Commission
rules concerning certificate legends or stop-transfer orders. The latter protective device also is available to the original seller of the
securities in the limited offering. To ensure this protection, an original purchaser should require at the time of purchase a written undertaking from the issuer that, upon request of the owner of the
securities, it will furnish the requisite statement of current ownership. An original seller or reseller should require an undertaking
from the buyer that he will not resell during the applicable restrictive period if the resale would result in more than thirty-five owners
provides advantages for one-year registrants. The Code permits an issuer to register voluntarily unless prohibited by Commission rule. RD 1-3 § 401(b).
37. Each resale is subject to the offering statement requirements unless there is an
available exemption or exception to the distribution concept. Since during the restrictive
period the trading transaction exception, the small offering exemption, the local distribution
exclusion, and the distribution statement provisions are all unavailable for resales of limited
offering securities, a reseller during the restrictive period either must use an effective offering
statement or rely upon the limited offering exception or some exemption created by Commission rule under § 302. Consequently, as a practical matter, the restrictive period operates in
most cases as a holding period. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
38. RD 1-3 § 272(b).

19771

EXEMPTIONS

and that he will seek the number of current owners from the issuer
or its transfer agent before reselling. Issuers should be able to maintain adequate control over this aspect of the resale problem by
maintaining separate transfer books for limited offerings, using appropriate stop-transfer notices and legends, and requiring representations of buyers with respect to indirect ownership.
The Code's approach to another resale problem is less successful. The reseller acts at his own risk in determining whether the
issuer is a one-year registrant and whether the applicable restrictive
period has ended. Prudent buyers should require at the time of
purchase a written undertaking of the issuer that it will provide
upon request a statement and an opinion of counsel reflecting the
current status of the issuer and indicating when the restrictive period ends. The Code, however, does not protect a reseller who in
good faith resells on the basis of such a statement and opinion. In
light of the absolute civil liability provisions of the Code, section
227(b)(7) should be expanded to include this protection.
The risks for a reseller arising from uncertainty as to when the
restrictive period begins and ends are magnified by the Code's application of the integration concept in defining the term "offering. ,,3'
The definition reflects the guidelines by which the SEC determines
when two or more offerings should be integrated and deemed a
single offering for the purpose of examining whether the private
placement, intrastate, or some other exemption is available for that
offering.'" Offerings of the same class of securities usually constitute
separate offerings if they are substantially distinct in manner, time,
purpose, price, and kind of consideration." The Code contains no
objective safe harbor provisions similar to those contained in rule
146, based upon the length of time between offerings, but the Commission is authorized to include such a provision should it decide
to define "offering" more specifically. 2 The restrictive period does
not begin until the last sale to a noninstitutional buyer in the offering.43 Thus in determining when the restrictive period begins and
39. RD 1-3 § 267.
40. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 1 FED. Sac. L. REP.(CCH)
12270; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 1 FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 2340.
41. Section 267(b) of the Code states that a limited offering, an offering by means of
trading transactions, and an offering in exempted transactions under §§ 511(e)-(g) are substantially distinct from each other and thus presumably will not be integrated.
42. This authority does not arise within § 267 itself but is derived either from the
general rulemaking authority in § 1502 of the Code or from the authority granted by §
227(b)(3) to promulgate a modified condition to the limited offering exemption.
43. An initial offering pursuant to the limited offering exception may continue for
several months or years. A buyer in such an offering is clearly at a disadvantage since he has
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ends, the reseller must examine, in the absence of a safe harbor
provision, not only the number of owners but also any other offerings
by the same person that might be integrated. A reseller has no
ability to gather the information necessary for this determination
and must rely upon a statement from the original seller. Again,
section 227(b) (7) should be expanded to protect a reseller who relies
in good faith upon such a statement.
An additional problem a reseller may have in determining the
applicability of the Code's resale restrictions arises when that person owns both securities purchased in a limited offering whose restrictive period has not expired and securities purchased either in
the market or as part of a limited offering whose restrictive period
has expired. Prior to adoption of rule 144 under the 1933 Act, the
SEC staff applied the doctrine of fungibility to this situation. Because the SEC considered the shares to be fungible and thus could
not determine whether the resale was of the privately-placed securities, a purchaser of securities in a private placement could not sell
any shares of the same issuer during the required holding period.
Rule 144 fortunately eliminated this troublesome concept for sales
falling within its purview. The Code, in the context of the limited
offering exception, continues the rule 144 policy. Under the Code,
when the seller owns some securities that are subject to resale restrictions and some that are not, any sale is to be considered a sale
of securities other than those subject to the resale restrictions, regardless of what certificates actually may be delivered, if the seller
retains (except for permitted resales) at least the number of shares
purchased in the limited offering during the restrictive period.4
Although the Code is silent on the point, if the seller fails to retain
a sufficient number of shares, the Commission or a court presumably could apply the fungibility doctrine to restrict all sales.
3.

Rules Adopted by the SEC. The third condition to the lim-

ited offering exception requires the original seller 5 and all resellers
no control over the point at which his restrictive resale period begins. In addition, the Code
will not permit a buyer to resell pursuant to a distribution statement even when the issuer is
a one-year registrant and will not permit reliance upon either the $100,000 small issue exemption or the trading transaction exception until the restrictive period has expired. The only
method of avoidance available to the buyer is through demand registration or through voluntary filing by an issuer of an offering statement. See RD 1-3 §§ 227(c)(1)(B), 509(a)(3),
511(d)(2). Buyers in a limited offering can inject some certainty into determining when the
restrictive period begins to run by insisting that an issuer undertake an outside date for
completion of the offering.
44. RD 1-3 § 227(b)(8).
45. The Code inexplicably uses the term "offeror" instead of seller but since the limited
offering exception concentrates only on sales, the condition presumably relates to the original
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during the restrictive period to comply with any rules that the SEC
may adopt concerning the obtaining of an appropriate written undertaking by a buyer, the placing of appropriate restrictive legends
on certificates for securities that are the subject of a limited offering,
and the giving of appropriate stop-transfer notices to the transfer
agent." Although none of these conditions exists until the Commission acts, the Commission is likely to promulgate a rule similar to
rule 146(h), which requires undertakings, legends, and stop-transfer
restrictions. These devices are useful to protect against illegal resales and inform buyers of existing restrictions on the ability to
resell. To require absolute compliance with a rule requiring such
devices, however, is unwise, because an inadvertent omission of a
legend or similar requirement would create an illegal distribution
and subject the seller to absolute civil liability under the Code. If
in fact no resales have violated the second condition of the limited
offering exception, it makes little sense to invalidate the exception
because of an inadvertent failure to comply with administrative
requirements designed to ensure that no illegal resales occur. The
Code should be modified to remove this possibility. 7
4. Modification of and Addition to the Expressed Conditions.
Section 227(b)(3) grants to the Commission authority to modify or
to add to the conditions of the limited offering exception." The
section in effect eliminates the necessity for a specific grant of authority to promulgate rules relating to resale protective devices as
the third condition to a limited offering. This authority to fashion
modified or additional conditions in the context of the limited offering exception is broad enough to permit the Commission to legislate
seller and one does not need to focus on the actions of the original offeror if for some reason
that person is not the original seller. RD 1-3 § 227(b)(1)(C).
46. RD 1-3 88 227(b)(1)(C), 227(b)(4). The Code recognizes that restrictions on transferability must be policed to be effective and that such policing must occur within the
parameters of the Uniform Commercial Code. Recognizing these parameters, § 227(b)(6)
states that an issuer or transfer agent need not police the restrictions unless the restriction is
between the issuer and the security holder or unless a stop-transfer notice has been received
by the issuer or transfer agent as the result of a resale by a buyer. TD-1 § 227(b)(6), Comment
7.
47. Similar criticisms have been made of the type of condition that is included as part
of rule 146. See Schneider & Zall, Section 12(1) and the Imperfect Exempt Transaction:
The ProposedI & I Defense, 28 Bus. LAW. 1011 (1973).
48. This section does contain a suggestion that the Commission in modifying or adding
conditions should consider, among other criteria, the type of issuer and security, the kind of
market, and the issuer's status as a one-year registrant. The suggested criteria do not impose
any real limitations upon the basic authority of the Commission to modify or to add conditions, especially since the section clearly states that other criteria may be considered. TD-1
§ 227(b)(3).
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as if it were Congress, even though its actions may operate to subvert the basic policy that the public interest in federal registration
of this type of offering is outweighed by the adverse effects upon
business' ability to raise capital. An example of the breadth of this
authority appears in one of the comments to the Code, which states
that pursuant to this authority the Commission may require impoundment of the proceeds of a limited offering and escrow of promotional shares. 9 Although the Reporter is confident that the Commission would be constrained by the spirit of the Code, " the Commission nevertheless could promulgate rules restoring many of the
subjective qualifications and informational requirements currently
in effect under rule 146. This possibility conflicts directly with the
desire for objectivity in the area of the limited offering exception.
Congress as a matter of policy should determine the appropriate
conditions for a limited offering and require that any additions or
modifications be made by statutory amendment or pursuant to such
general rulemaking powers of the Commission as are set forth in
section 1502 of the Code."
5. Secondary Limited Offerings. Unlike the private placement
exemption under section 4(2), the limited offering exception is not
limited to sales by issuers. It is available for secondary sales that
meet all of the requisite conditions. The confusion existing under
the 1933 Act caused by the section 4(1-1/2) exemption is thus eliminated, but the nonissuer seller may have difficulty in adequately
controlling resales during the restrictive period and in complying
with any rules that may be adopted by the Commission. These
problems likely will be worked out in time. Moreover, since the Code
49. TD-1 § 227, Comment (6). Section 505 of the Code also provides the Commission
with specific authority to promulgate such a rule. This authority to impound proceeds and
escrow securities, while subject to criticism, survived a motion to delete at the 1972 annual
meeting of the American Law Institute. See 49 ALI PRoCEEDINGs 389-94 (1972).
50. 49 ALI PROCEEDINGS 376 (1972). The Commission traditionally has favored the view
that, above all, registration is the desired end and that exemptions, therefore, are to be
limited when possible. In addition, the Commission's enforcement division desires to avoid
the certainty of objective exemptions in order to maximize its ability to attack fraudulent
and illegal schemes. These forces may bring about the imposition of conditions that are more
restrictive than either the Reporter or Congress intends. Cf. SEC-Congress Rift Is Possible
Over Bid To AlterBrokerLaw, Wall Street J., Feb. 7, 1977, at 8, col. 2 (Commission interpreting discretionary rulemaking authority more broadly than Congress intended).
51.
Section 1502 continues and broadens the Commission's authority under the 1933
Act to adopt, condition, amend, suspend, and repeal rules in a variety of ways, including the
defining of terms. This general authority is sufficient for the Commission to impose modified
or additional conditions to the limited offering exception but contains some limitations. It
requires the Commission to determine that the action is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for investor protection in connection with carrying out the purposes fairly intended
by the policy of the Code. RD 1-3 § 1502.
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provides secondary distributors with other convenient exceptions
and exemptions and immediately effective distribution and demand
offering statements, the need for the limited offering exception in
secondary sales may be far less under the Code than under current
law.
B.

The Trading Transaction

A further exception from the Code's definition of distribution
is the trading transaction. The exception, defined in section 227(c),
deals with the problem of distinguishing secondary distributions,
which are made by persons other than an issuer and need to be
channeled through the registration process, from routine trading
transactions, which need not be registered. As in the private offering
area, the Code seeks to clarify and to remove the subjective uncertainties surrounding present application to secondary transactions
of sections 4(1) and 4(4) of the 1933 Act.
(1)

The Current Law

Under the 1933 Act the section 4(1) exemption is designed to
remove ordinary trading transactions from registration and prospectus delivery requirements while subjecting to those requirements all
transactions involving a distribution of securities. Section 4(1) exempts transactions only if they are by a person other than "an
issuer, underwriter or dealer." Determining whether a person is an
issuer or dealer presents little practical difficulty. Most of the problems relate to the "underwriter" portion of the exemption and arise
because of the complex definition of the term contained in section
2(11) of the 1933 Act. That section defines underwriters as those
who purchase from an issuer with a view to a distribution, who offer
or sell for an issuer in connection with a distribution, or who participate directly or indirectly in any of these undertakings. In defining
"underwriter," section 2(11) includes within the term "issuer" any
person who directly or indirectly stands in a control relationship
with an issuer ("controlling person"). In addition to the previously
discussed restrictions imposed by the phrase "with a view to" upon
public resales by persons buying securities in an exempted private
offering, the definition restricts public resales by controlling persons
because these transactions, if they are distributions rather than
52
routine trading transactions, will involve statutory underwriters.
52. See generaky United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 946 (1969); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946); Sommer, Who's "In
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The absence of a statutory definition of distribution, the expansive SEC view of the concept of a controlling person, and the development of such amorphous concepts as "presumptive underwriter '"'
and "float policy"5 4 resulted in confusion among lawyers about when
and under what circumstances secondary sales by controlling persons were permissible without registration. In 1972, the SEC promulgated rule 144 under the 1933 Act to provide certainty in this
area by defining the term "distribution" specifically for the purpose
of determining who is an underwriter under sections 2(11) and 4(1).
The rule imposes conditions concerning the availability of public
information, a two-year holding period for securities acquired in a
private offering, a limitation on the number of securities that can
be sold within a six-month period, a restriction on the manner of
sale requiring ordinary brokerage transactions, and a requirement
for the filing of a notice of offering. A transaction must meet all of
the rule's specifications to qualify for the section 4(1) exemption.
The rule in effect establishes the parameters of the routine trading
transaction and is viewed by the SEC as the exclusive means by
which a controlling person may sell securities publicly in reliance
upon the section 4(1) exemption. The rule does not apply to sales
of securities acquired by noncontrolling persons in market transactions, because these secondary transactions generally do not involve
a statutory underwriter. Thus, in most cases, noncontrolling persons
may sell freely outside of rule 144 in reliance upon the section 4(1)
exemption.
Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966); Note, Regulation of Non-Issuer Transactions
Under Federaland State Securities Registration Laws, 78 H~Av. L. REv. 1635 (1965).
53. The presumptive underwriter doctrine reflects the SEC staff's position that purchasers of more than 10% of a registered public offering are underwriters within the meaning
of § 2(11) of the 1933 Act even if such persons are not controlling persons of the issuer. See
generally Nathan, Presumptive Underwriters,8 REv. SEC. REG. 881 (1975).
54. The float policy represented the SEC staff's position that a seller would be deemed
an underwriter under § 2(11) if his sales exceeded 10% of the freely traded securities of the
issuer (the float). See generally Grosz, SEC 'Float'Policy, 6 REv. SEC. REG. 936 (1973); cf.
SEC No-Action Letter, Professional Care Services, Inc., (available Oct. 12, 1973), (1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,542. In 1975 the staff abandoned the float
policy and began to focus upon the nature and size of the selling broker's effort and commission to determine the existence of a distribution when securities are sold outside of rule 144.
Nevertheless, the staff still considers the size of the proposed sale relative to the trading
market by refusing to issue no-action letters when a sale will have an adverse impact on the
trading market. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, Synergistics, Inc., (available Dec. 23, 1976).
As a practical matter, this approach is applied most often to secondary sales of large blocks
of securities acquired in a private offering prior to April 15, 1972, the effective date of rule
144. Any other secondary sales are made pursuant to rule 144 or clearly are exempt under §
4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970). See generally Goldwasser, Resale Exemption Developments,
8 REv. SEC. REG. 860 (1975).
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Since most secondary sales are made through the use of a broker, the broker also must find an exemption for its part of the
transaction. Because brokers are included in the 1933 Act's definition of dealer, they may not rely upon the section 4(1) exemption.
The broker, however, is specifically exempted by sections 4(3) or
4(4), which generally act coordinately with the section 4(1) exemption to permit ordinary trading transactions.5 Rule 144 requires that
all resales made in reliance upon it be made in "brokers' transactions" within the meaning of section 4(4) and defines that term in
subparagraph (g) to ensure that the broker is not aware after reasonable inquiry that the seller is engaged in a prohibited distribution
and that the broker will not receive an unusual commission or exert
unusual selling efforts or pressures.
The cumulative effect of the section 4(1) and 4(4) exemptions
and rule 144 is to permit controlling persons to make routine trades
by selling limited amounts of securities in ordinary brokerage transactions. All other sales by controlling persons are distributions subject to the registration provisions. Noncontrolling persons, on the
other hand, generally are subject to none of these restrictions unless
they are reselling privately-placed stock.
(2)

The Code Approach

The Code approach to the problem of secondary transactions
differs significantly from current law. The troublesome concepts of
underwriter, control, and controlling person are abandoned. All secondary sales of nonexempted securities, whether by controlling persons or noncontrolling persons and whether the securities were acquired in the market or otherwise, are treated alike. Unless the
transactions specifically are exempted or do not involve distributions, the filing requirements of the Code must be met.
In addition to various exemptions permitting limited secondary
distributions when the public interest in registration is de minimis,56
the Code provides a secondary distributor with relatively simple
filing requirements. If the issuer is a one-year registrant, the secondary seller may elect to file and deliver to the buyer a distribution
55. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5168 (July 1, 1971), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
22,760; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962), 17 C.F.R. § 241.6721, 2 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
22,753; cf. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966), 17
C.F.R. § 231.4818, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2920 (discussing limitations on rule 154).
56. The principal exemption upon which secondary distributors may rely is the small
offering exemption, which permits secondary transactions up to $100,000. RD 1-3 § 511(d);
see note 125 infra and accompanying text.
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statement that is effective immediately upon filing. 7 If the issuer
is not a one-year registrant, the secondary seller may require the
issuer to file an offering statement at the selling shareholder's expense in accordance with the registration-on-demand provisions of
section 501(b). Despite their availability, the distribution statement
and registration on demand are likely to be used only when an
exemption is not readily available or when a transaction is a distribution because the seller cannot satisfy the conditions for a trading
transaction or a limited offering.
Section 227(c) defines "trading transaction" as a transaction
that is made through a broker or with or by a dealer and satisfies a
number of conditions. Since a secondary trading transaction under
the Code may be made directly with a dealer, the Code eliminates
the distinction made by the 1933 Act between brokers and dealers
that effectively restricts secondary sales by controlling persons to
brokers' transactions only. This change is necessary because the
distinction is increasingly formal and artificial. This section of the
Code, however, makes additional changes in existing law that are
less desirable. Under the 1933 Act, two or more noncontrolling persons who transact a sale between or among themselves without a
broker or a dealer fall within the section 4(1) exemption. No policy
arguments support application of the offering statement requirements to a transaction between two individuals in which one would
sell the other 1,000 shares of IBM common stock without the use of
a broker or dealer. Nevertheless, under the Code the seller in such
transactions must file an offering statement in the form of a distribution statement unless the limited offering exception with all its
restrictions applies.1
In addition to selling through a broker or with or by a dealer, a
secondary seller must satisfy four conditions before the transaction
qualifies for the trading transaction exception.
1. Prohibitionon Issuer Transactions.Similar to present pro57. RD 1-3 § 509. The distribution statement is expected to be a concise document that
describes the secondary distribution, identifies the issuer's most recent annual report and all
subsequent reports thereto that are on file at the Commission, and contains a certification
by the secondary distributor that he is not aware of any material facts that should be disclosed pursuant to the Code's antifraud provisions. Additionally, the annual report and
subsequent reports must be incorporated physically if the issuer does not have at least 1,000
stockholders and $100,000 in total assets for its last two fiscal year-ends or when the Commission requires incorporation by rule. The Code imposes civil liability upon a secondary distributor for a false distribution statement. RD 1-3 § 1405.
58. This result assumes that the transaction is an offering in excess of $100,000, which
precludes reliance upon the small offering exemption contained in § 511(d), and that the
Commission does not promulgate any other applicable exemptive rules.
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visions of section 4(1), an issuer or one selling for the account or
benefit of an issuer may not rely upon the trading transaction exception. The Code comments, however, suggest that the Commission
consider modifying this condition on the theory that trading transactions are so routine that the offering statement protections are
unnecessary even for issuer transactions. 5 Regardless of the merits
of permitting an issuer to engage in trading transactions, the suggestion demonstrates the troublesome breadth of the Commission's
authority under section 227(c)(2) to modify or to add to the statutory conditions to the trading transaction exception and thereby to
tamper with legislative policy. This rulemaking authority closely
parallels that granted the Commission regarding the limited offering exception and is subject to the same objections. 0 The limited
offering and trading transaction exceptions embody fundamental
policy considerations that, once made by Congress, should be
changed only by Congress or within the parameters established for
the Commission's general rulemaking authority.
2. Prohibition of Limited Offering Securities. The trading
transaction exception is not available for the resale of securities
acquired pursuant to the limited offering exception if the applicable
restrictive period has not expired, even though the resale would not
violate the restriction on number of owners or any other condition
contained in that exception. A buyer in a limited offering, in effect,
cannot resell publicly through a broker or dealer during the restrictive period except through an offering statement.' This prohibition
prevents broad public leakage through trading transactions of securities sold in a limited offering by either an issuer or a secondary
seller during the applicable restrictive period. Considering the policy behind the limited offering exception, the prohibition is sound.
The Code comments, however, suggest that the Commission may
soften this condition by using the broad modification authority of
section 227(c) (2) to permit buyers in a secondary limited offering to
make limited trading transactions up to the volume of trading
59. TD-1 § 227, Comment (11).
60. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. The sample criteria included in §
227(c)(2) are the kind of market, the kind and degree of solicitation or other selling effort,
and the issuer's status as a one-year registrant. This section, like § 227(b)(3), clearly permits
other criteria to be considered in modifying and imposing additional conditions.
61. This limitation arises because neither the small offering exemption nor the immediately effective distribution statement may be used to effect a transaction in a security that
was the subject of a limited offering during the applicable restrictive period. Subject to the
integration concepts contained in the definition of offering, a buyer in a limited offering may
make a second limited offering before the restrictive period has expired. TD-1 § 227, Comment (12)(b).
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transactions their sellers might have effected.2 This suggestion is
further evidence of the Commission's ability to make basic policy
decisions that arguably should be made by Congress.
3. An OrdinaryBroker or Dealer Transaction. The broker or
dealer in a trading transaction must perform no more than its usual
function in a trading transaction and must receive no unusual compensation. These conditions are designed to ensure that the trading
transaction is in fact an ordinary brokers' or dealers' transaction
and that the transaction does not involve the selling pressures or the
large commissions associated with a distribution. The term "usual
function," unknown to the 1933 Act, is left undefined by the Code
and thus may vary in meaning under different circumstances. The
Commission, however, may and probably will adopt a rule defining
the term in much the same fashion as it defines "brokers' transactions" in rule 144(g) under the 1933 Act, with appropriate adjustments to provide for the practical distinctions between transactions
by dealers and those by brokers.
"Unusual compensation" is another undefined term in the
Code that is likely to be defined by the Commission. The definition
presumably will be based to some extent upon the existing
"reasonable relationship to market" rule.13 Unlike the 1933 Act, the
Code contains no prohibition against solicitation by brokers or dealers, although the Commission has authority to impose this condition. Evolving market practices and concepts of what constitutes a
customary broker's or dealer's transaction make rulemaking authority in this area particularly necessary to ensure that changing conditions do not undermine the policies underlying the statutory language. The Code's general rulemaking provisions provide ample
flexibility without the unlimited authority to modify or add conditions contained in section 227(c)(2).
4. Limitations on the Amount of SecuritiesSold. A secondary
seller relying on the trading transaction exception must not eiceed
limitations specified by Commission rule on the volume of securities
that can be sold in all trading transactions by or for the account of
the same person during a specified period. Although exact volume
and period limitations are currently unknown, the limitations, when
established, will become a condition to the trading transaction exception. The limitations likely will be patterned after those contained in rule 144(e), which are keyed to either average weekly trad62.
63.

TD-1 § 227, Comment (12)(b).
See TD-1 § 227, Comment (13) and the authorities cited therein.
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ing volume or one percent of the outstanding securities during a sixmonth period. The Commission needs this flexibility to adapt the
condition to practical operations of evolving market systems, but
this flexibility is not open-ended, being contained within the condition itself and is thus limited by the basic policy decision of Congress that some limitation on the amount of securities sold be a
condition to this exception.
Since the conditions to the trading transaction exception relate
to the activities of the broker or dealer involved in the transaction,
and because these activities generally are outside the control and
knowledge of a secondary seller, the Code extends protection from
the absolute civil liability accompanying an illegal distribution to
those secondary sellers who reasonably believe that the conditions
are satisfied. 4 The Code provides similar protection for brokers and
dealers when satisfaction of conditions is within theA control and
knowledge of the secondary seller. This policy is well-founded and
will result in continuance of the existing practice of obtaining representation letters from both the seller and the broker or dealer in a
trading transaction.
The trading transaction exception ordinarily poses few practical problems for the typical investor. It may be of limited use,
however, to the institutional investor who frequently sells in blocks
exceeding the probable volume limitation of the exception and in a
manner violating the exception's broker-dealer conditions. Section
4(1) of the 1933 Act exempts such sellers and normally allows them
to sell freely without volume or other restrictions unless they are
selling control or restricted securities. The Code, however, subjects
all nonexempt secondary distributions to its filing requirements,
and thus requires the block trader or institutional seller to qualify
for some exemption or to fit its transaction within an exception to
the term "distribution." Recognizing the practical difficulty of
qualifying these trades under the conditions to the trading transaction exception, the comments to section 227 suggest that special
treatment should be considered in connection with Part IX (Market
Regulation) of the Code. 5 Although Part IX was approved by the
American Law Institute in April 1976, no provisions for the block
trading problem were included.
64. RD 1-3 § 227(c)(3). The reasonable care defense is framed more broadly than the
good faith defense provided for an original seller or a reseller in the limited offering exception.
The reasonable care defense applies to all of the conditions of the trading transaction exception, including any conditions modified or added by Commission rule. Compare RD 1-3 §
227(c)(3), with RD 1-3 § 227(b)(7).
65. TD-1 § 227, Comment (18).
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III. THE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION
Even if an offering is a distribution because it fails to meet the
conditions of either the limited offering or trading transaction exceptions, the offering and distribution statement provisions of the
Code do not apply if that distribution is a "local distribution"
within the meaning of section 513. The local distribution concept
succeeds the intrastate offering exemption provided by section
3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act.
A.

The CurrentLaw

Section 3(a)(11) exempts from the registration requirements of
the 1933 Act "any security which is part of an issue offered and sold
only to persons resident within a single state or territory where the
issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business
within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within, such state or territory." This transaction exemption reflects
a congressional policy decision to leave purely local sales of securities to state regulation.6 Despite the clear legislative intent underlying the exemption, considerable confusion and uncertainty exist
concerning the requisite components of the exemption. In response
to that confusion and uncertainty, the Commission in 1974 promulgated rule 147 to provide greater objectivity in determining when
the section 3(a)(11) exemption is available."7 Rule 147 is not an
exclusive rule and because its objective conditions are difficult to
meet, the residual law of section 3(a)(11) frequently is relied upon
to establish the exemption.68
The intrastate offering exemption poses three major problem
areas:
1. Nature of the Issuer. Although the statute clearly requires
that the issuer be incorporated in the state of the offering, the mean66. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The Commission in interpreting
the exemption consistently has taken the position that it must be applied narrowly in order
to achieve the congressional intent that it be limited to local financing provided by local
investors for local companies. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961),
1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2270. Although the exemption occurs under a section of the 1933
Act entitled "Exempted Securities," the exemption always has been considered a transaction
exemption. A seller of securities purchased in an exempted intrastate offering must seek
another exemption for his sale.
67. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974) [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79, 617.
68. For a detailed outline comparing the residual law of § 3(a)(11) and rule 147, see
Cheek, Rule 147 and the Intrastate Offering Exemption, THE 140 SERmSs-A How-To-Do-IT
APPROACH (PLI Course Handbook No. 178) (1975).
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ing of the statutory requirement that the issuer be "doing business"
within the state or territory is unclear. Neither the statute nor its
legislative history defines the required quantum of business. Current residual law requires an issuer to have "substantial" or
"predominant" operations within the state," and rule 147 requires
compliance with narrow and restrictive percentage tests before an
issuer is deemed to be "doing business" within a state. 71 Another
closely related problem concerns the use of the proceeds from the
offering; rule 147 requires that eighty percent of the offering's net
proceeds be used in connection with local operations, and residual
case law prohibits the use of proceeds primarily for the purpose of
establishing a new business outside the state of incorporation that
is unrelated to some incidental, locally-conducted business. 7' The
impracticality of tracing proceeds to their ultimate use often is a
major obstacle in satisfying this portion of the exemption.
2. Residence of Each Offeree and Purchaser.The 1933 Act
requires that the offering be made only to persons "resident" within
a state, but does not define residence. The Commission traditionally
has construed residence to mean domicile, as that term is applied
to conflicts-of-laws questions. Rule 147, however, abandons the
domicile test in favor of a test under which residence is established
if the state is the principal residence at the time of the offer and sale.
Since the residence requirement of both rule 147 and the statute
apparently applies to all offerees, issuers face the difficult burden
of proving that all offerees resided in the state. In addition, because
of the absolute civil liability provisions of section 12(1), good faith
reliance by the issuer upon an offeree's or purchaser's representation
of residence is no defense if either is in fact a resident of another
state. Similarly, a purchaser's representation that he is acting for
his own account is not likely to protect the issuer if the purchase is
actually for nonresidents. Because the offering of a single share to a
nonresident may destroy the exemption, the residence requirement
creates substantial risks for an issuer.
3. The "Coming-to-Rest" Concept. Even if all offerees and
purchasers reside in a single state, securities that are part of an
69. See, e.g., Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. 2270.
70. In general, under rule 147, 80% of an issuer's consolidated gross revenues and gross
assets must be generated from within the state. The same percentage of its gross assets must
be located within the state. Practical problems often arise in computing the precise percentage and in determining the source of revenues and the location of asset;, particularly in
businesses that provide services.
71. See SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
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intrastate issue cannot immediately be resold to nonresidents; the
securities must "come to rest" in the hands of residents buying for
investment and not with a view to distribution and resale. Once
having come to rest, the securities may be resold to nonresidents
without affecting the intrastate exemption for the offering. Although no precise holding period is set forth in the statute, the
Commission staff generally requires at least a period of one year."
Under rule 147 the SEC objectively determines when an issue has
come to rest by prohibiting resales to nonresidents during the distribution of any part of an issue and for nine months from the date of
the last sale of securities that are part of that issue. Determining the
beginning and ending of the nine-month period is often difficult
because the integration doctrine may combine separate but related
issuances.
Because of this resale restriction, certain precautions such as
legends on stock certificates, stop-transfer instructions, and written
representations from purchasers generally are taken to protect
against interstate distributions. While the language of section
3(a)(11) does not require these precautions, one of the conditions to
rule 147 requires these precautions so if one is overlooked inadvertently, the protective presumption of the rule becomes unavailable
to the issuer.
The above mentioned problem areas, particularly those relating
to restrictions on the residence of offerees and on resales, make the
intrastate offering exemption very narrow and risky. The risk element, coupled with the absolute civil liability of section 12(1) of the
1933 Act, limits the practical use of the exemption to those types of
offerings that are adaptable to strict control mechanisms and to
those occurring in states with large geographical areas.
B.

The Code Approach

During the drafting of the Code, considerable discussion was
devoted to repeal of the intrastate offering exemption, because of
the difficulties and risks associated with satisfying the strict requirements of rule 147 and section 3(a)(11).1 The drafters were
72. See generally SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958), afl'd,
276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
73. The arguments made in favor of repeal were: (a) the fortuitous operation of the
exemption because of geographical considerations; (b) the uneven enforcement of blue sky
regulation among the states; (c) the tendency of the exemption to trap the unsophisticated,
particularly in view of the absolute civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act; and (d) the
Commission's ample authority under § 302 to adopt exemptive rules that consider the essen-
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influenced by state securities administrators, who considered continuation of the exemption to be essential to preserving their responsibilities and effectiveness in regulating local issues. Thus the Code
includes in section 513 a local distribution exemption for all securities other than debt securities. 74 The section substantially modifies
existing conditions for an exempt intrastate offering by providing
greater objectivity and broadening the usefulness of the exemption
as an alternative to the offering or distribution statement requirements of the Code.
To qualify as a local distribution, an offering must meet four
requirements.
1. Residence of Purchasers.The Code dramatically changes
the current residence requirements by eliminating the focus upon
offerees and examining only the residence of those persons who actually purchase. In addition, instead of restricting sales to residents
of a single state, thereby creating fortuitous geographical barriers to
the use of the exemption, the Code requires that sales be
"substantially restricted" to residents of a single state or of an area
in "contiguous states" that the Commission may delineate by rule
according to population and economic characteristics. 75 Thus, although some uncertainty will remain until the term "substantially"
is defined by Commission rule or case law, the exemption is not
jeopardized by a single sale or by a few sales to nonresidents of the
state of applicable area. While complete transformation from the
single state approach of section 3(a)(11) to the local area approach
of the Code depends upon the adoption of rules defining permitted
tially intrastate character of an offering. See TD-4 § 513, Comment (2); 52 ALI PROCEEDINGS
438-44 (1975).
74. Both the 1933 Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 1940 exempt intrastate offerings
of debt securities. 1933 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970); Trust Indenture Act §
304(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4) (1970). An intrastate offering of a bond issue is not registered under the 1933 Act, and its indenture is not qualified under the Trust Indenture Act
and need not provide for an independent trustee unless applicable state law so requires. Over
the strong objections of the state securities administrators, the Code removes debt securities
from the local distribution exemption and, unless otherwise exempted, subjects a distribution
of them to the provisions that succeed the Trust Indenture Act. The federal interest in
ensuring that indentures adequately safeguard the rights and interests of buyers and that the
trustees are free from conflicting interests should override the desire of state administrators
to retain exclusive regulation of intrastate offerings of debt securities. See 52 ALI PROCEEDNGs
443-44, 451-54 (1975).
75. TD-4 § 513(a)(1). This provision also authorizes the Commission to define by rule
an area including a state and a contiguous foreign country, authority that the comments
indicate is designed to permit a local distribution in a concentrated population area that spills
over into a foreign country, such as the Detroit-Windsor (Ontario) area. TD-4 § 513, Comment (5)(b).
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bistate or multistate areas, the Code strongly-and wisely-suggests that the Commission promulgate rules permitting the use of
the exemption in areas with large population concentrations that
cross state lines, such as the area surrounding New York City. The
Code further broadens the exemption by defining "resident" as "a
natural person . . .resident but not necessarily domiciled in a
specific place," 7 thereby avoiding the problems associated with the
section 3(a)(11) exemption.
2. Nature of Issuer.The Code rejects the approach of the 1933
Act, which limits the use of the intrastate exemption to issuers
incorporated in the state of the offering, and requires only that that
issuer have its principal place of business in the state or area of the
offering. Moreover, the Code does not require the issuer to be "doing
business" in the sense that the term is used in 1933 Act. Thus an
issuer may qualify for the exemption under the Code even when a
substantial portion of its business is conducted outside the relevant
state or area.
Unlike rule 147 the section 513 exemption is not limited to
issuers. The exemption, with certain limitations, is available to secondary distributors, who need not be residents of the state or area
in which the issuer has its principal place of business or in which
substantially all of the purchasers reside. However, secondary distributors holding securities purchased in a limited offering whose
restrictive resale period has not expired may not use the exemption
for secondary distributions of the same class of securities. Although
prohibiting the use of the local distribution exemption as an outlet
for limited offering securities during their restrictive resale periods
is consistent with the policy underlying the limited offering exception, injection of the fungibility concept into the exemption is unnecessary. The fungibility concept does not permit a secondary distributor who owns securities purchased in the market and in a limited offering to rely upon the exemption for the sale of any securities
during the restrictive period. The matter, however, probably is not
of major significance, as the comments point out, because a secondary seller normally sells either by using a distribution statement if
the issuer is a one-year registrant or pursuant to the small offering
exemption or the trading transaction exception, neither of which
77
includes a fungibility concept.
76. RD 1-3 § 291.
77. TD-4 § 513, Comment (8). The distribution statement and the trading transaction
exception could be used to resell the securities purchased in the market but not to resell those
purchased in the limited offering during the restrictive period.
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3. Additional Conditions Specified by the SEC. As was done
with the limited offering and trading transaction exceptions, the
Code grants the Commission authority to add by rule other conditions based upon several specified criteria or upon any other similar
criteria. 78 This authority is extensive and, given the Commission's
traditional disdain for the intrastate exemption, likely will be used
in a restrictive fashion. For example, several of the specified criteria
could be used to impose conditions similar to those contained in rule
147, and one of the criteria, the size of the distribution, suggests the
imposition of dollar limitations, a concept totally foreign to current
law and policy. The Code comments further suggest that one of the
unspecified "similar criteria" might be the kind (that is, effectiveness) of blue sky regulation in the particular state or area. 71 Such a
consideration could result in federal second-guessing and in a limited form of preemption. Should Congress decide to continue some
form of the intrastate exemption, which is a matter of substantial
and legitimate question, it should not authorize the Commission to
gut the purposes and effective uses of the exemption through restrictive rulemaking.
4. Resales. The Code does not specify a holding period, but
through a cross reference to the section 227(b)(4) rulemaking authority concerning the limited offering exception," permits the
Commission to promulgate a rule establishing a restrictive period
of up to one year. During this period, resales could be made only in
a manner consistent with the conditions of section 513, which would
include any rules the Commission had adopted concerning written
representations from a buyer regarding residence and other appropriate matters and concerning the policing of resales through the use
of legends and stop-transfer notices.
An original seller or a reseller in a local distribution who in good
faith receives a written undertaking from his buyer that is reasonably designed to avoid an illegal distribution and who complies with
Commission rules relating to legends and other policing devices is
78. TD-4 § 513(a)(3); see RD 1.3 § 513(a)(3). The criteria to be considered are the type
of issuer and security, the kind of market, the size of the distribution, and the issuer's status
as a one-year registrant.
79. See TD-4 § 513, Comment (4). That this exemption should be applied only to states
that have effective legislation and effective administration of that legislation is a forceful
argument. The drafters of the Code, however, found it impractical to devise a scheme for
deciding which states were effective blue sky states and which were not. See 52 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 439-40 (1975). If in their collective wisdom the Code draftsmen were unable to
devise a satisfactory condition relating to the effectiveness of state regulation, it is unlikely
that the Commission would be able to do so and should not be invited to do so.
80. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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protected by the Code from the absolute civil liability accompanying an illegal distribution. 8 This protection is not likely to extend
either to an issuer that knows or suspects that its principal place of
business is not within the applicable state or area, but that otherwise structures the distribution to meet the local distribution exemption, or to a reseller who relies on an issuer's representation of
its principal place of business. Consideration should be given to
extending the protection to cover the latter situation.
The fungibility question relating to resales of securities purchased in a local distribution is dealt with as it is in the limited
offering exception. A reseller who holds some securities that were
not the subject of a local distribution and some securities that were
the subject of a local distribution for which the restrictive resale
period has not expired may sell any of his securities if during the
restrictive period he retains at least as many securities as were
purchased in the local distribution.
IV.

EXEMPTED SECURITIES

Even if an offering is a distribution not qualifying as a local
distribution, it does not trigger the registration, offering, or distribution statement provisions of the Code if it involves an exempted
security. Exempted securities are set forth in section 301 and have
significance beyond the registration provisions of the Code, applying
whenever a section specifically excludes exempted securities. In
addition, section 302 grants the Commission broad authority to
fashion exemptions by rule or order. Consistent with present policy
under the 1933 Act, however, no exempted security is exempt from
the antifraud provisions of the Code.
The exempted securities under the Code generally are the same
as those under the 1933 and 1934 Acts with certain exceptions. The
Code, for example, provides neither an exemption for ICC-approved
securities of railroads and motor carriers 2 nor a general exemption
for either bank or insurance company securities. 3 The following
81. TD-4 § 513(d)(2); RD 1-3 § 513(d)(2).
82. These securities are exempted under the 1933 Act by § 3(a)(6), 15 U.S.C.§ 77c(a)(6)
(1970), but are not exempt under the 1934 Act. The Interstate Commerce Commission has
favored repeal of the 1933 Act exemption. See TD-1 § 301, General Comment (1).
83. While securities issued by insurance companies never have been exempt under the
1933 Act, § 12(g)(2)(G) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1970), exempts insurance
company securities from its registration requirements if in substance its domiciliary state
regulates insurance companies with legislation that is comparable to the reporting, proxy, and
insider trading provisions of the 1934 Act. The many difficulties associated with judging
whether a particular state has legislation sufficiently comparable to the 1934 Act convinced
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discussion focuses upon those securities exempted by section 301 of
the Code and reflects the principal changes in existing law effected
by the Code.
1. Securities Issued or Guaranteed by American Governments. Section 301(a) exempts Government and municipal securities. The Code defines the term "Government security" as a
security (including a revenue obligation) issued by or whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States or one of its
agencies or instrumentalities. 4 The term "municipal security" is
defined as either (a) a security (including a revenue obligation)
issued by or whose principal and interest are guaranteed by a state
or one of its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities or
(b) an industrial development bond, as defined in section 103(c)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code, on which the interest is excluded from
gross income under the Internal Revenue Code as a result of meeting
certain standards within section 103(c) (4) or section 103(c) (6) of the
Internal Revenue Code.85
The exemption continues the substance of the present exemptions for these types of securities except that certificates of deposit
for Government or municipal securities are not included. Thus any
distribution of the latter that is not otherwise exempt must comply
with the applicable filing provisions of the Code.8" Unlike current
law, which either is silent on the matter or permits the guaranty to
relate to principal or to interest, this exemption requires that the
guaranty relating to Government or municipal securities run to both
principal and interest.
2. SecuritiesIssued or Guaranteedby IndigenousBodies. Section 301(b) exempts securities issued or whose principal and interest
are guaranteed by the Hopi Tribal Council and securities issued by
a corporation pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.
While not recognized under the federal securities laws, this exemption is designed to meet certain special interests and has support
the Code draftsmen that the exemption should not be continued. See 49 ALI PROCEEDiNGS
425-27 (1972). With respect to the exemption for bank securities, see note 89 infra and
accompanying text.
84. TD-5 § 236.
85. TD-5 § 259E. While municipal securities are exempt from the offering statement
requirements of the Code, dealers or nonbank brokers in these securities are not. TD-5 §
701(a).
86. The Code's exemption is based generally upon § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(2) (1970), § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970), and § 2(a)(16)
of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(16) (1970). With respect to the decision
not to exempt certificates of deposit, see TD-5 § 259E, Comment (5).
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and precedent either directly or indirectly in other existing federal
legislation. 7
3. Securities Issued or Guaranteed by International Banks.
Section 301(c) exempts a security issued by or whose principal and
interest are guaranteed by an international bank of which the
United States is a member, a class including at present only the
International, Latin American, and Asian Banks. This provision
continues exemptions provided for in the federal legislation specifically relating to these banks. 88
4. Bank Securities. The Code eliminates the general exemption for bank securities currently found in section 3(a)(2) of the 1933
Act but retains a limited exemption8 9 applicable to securities representing general bank obligations" ranking on at least a parity with
deposit accounts and to any securities guaranteed by these obligations. Thus a distribution of bank stock or capital notes, unless
otherwise exempted, is subject to the offering statement requirements of the Code as administered and enforced by the SEC and
not the bank regulators. Because the Code's definition of "security"
excludes interests in bank deposit accounts and any certificiate of
deposit ranking on a parity with these interests,9 a note to section
301(d) suggests that the exemption may apply only to those bonds
and unsecured debentures that federal or state banking authorities
might permit banks to issue on a parity with deposit accounts.
Few policy objections can be raised to eliminating the general
exemption or to exempting ordinary bank debt securities, but the
other likely use of the exemption-permitting the public distribution of securities simply because they are backed by bank letters of
credit or certain other guaranty devices-raises legitimate concern.
87. Act of May 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-264, § 6, 84 Stat. 260 (1970); Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 1625 (Supp. V 1975). The exemption relating to the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act expires on December 31, 1991.
88. Bretton Woods Agreements Act § 15, 22 U.S.C. § 286k-l(a) (1970); Inter-American
Development Bank Act § 11, 22 U.S.C. § 283h (1970); Asian Development Bank Act § 3(b),
22 U.S.C. § 285h (1970). The Code proposes the repeal of the provisions in these three statutes
relating to the securities laws.
89. RD 1-3 § 301(d); TD-1 § 301(d). Bank securities never have been fully exempt under
the 1934 Act, but under § 12(i) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (Supp. V 1975), they are
regulated by the federal banking agencies on certain matters. The Code does not include a
successor to § 12(i) and thus strips the bank regulators of their jurisdiction over many matters
relating to bank securities. See TD-5 § 1501A & Comments.
90. Section 209 of the Code defines "bank" to include national banks, member banks
of the Federal Reserve System, and all state banks if a substantial portion of their business
is similar to that of national banks and if they are supervised by a federal or state banking
regulatory agency. RD 1-3 § 209.
91. RD 1-3 § 297(b)(4).
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Permitting broad public sales of small-denomination commerical
paper or debt securities of speculative, high-risk companies is arguably contrary to sound regulatory policy, even when backed by bank
letters of credit, which themselves are not always financially
sound.2 Inclusion of bank-guaranteed securities in the limited exemption may be justifiable, however, when one considers: the public
interest in gearing up the federal machinery through the Code's
offering statement requirements; the economic importance of the
continued unfettered use of guarantees as a means of facilitating
sales of debt instruments; the Code's antifraud provisions; and the
ability of federal banking authorities to exercise effective control
over the solvency and liquidity of banks. 3
5. Bank Common Trust Funds. The Code continues the current federal securities law exemption for an interest or participation
in a common trust fund or in a similar fund maintained by a bank
exclusively for the collective investment of assets held by the bank
as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or similar personalized fiduciary capacity. 4 The provision exempts interests or participations in such funds if the funds are used for the collective investment of assets held by the bank as a bona fide fiduciary, are incident
to its traditional trust department activities, and are not merely
vehicles for direct investment by individuals. Thus the exemption
does not cover the collective investment of funds from individual
retirement accounts (IRA's) established pursuant to section 408 of
the Internal Revenue Code or from H.R. 10 retirement plans (H.R.
10's).11 Because of the increasingly broad use of IRA's and H.R. 10's,
92. See 49 ALI PROCEEDINGS, 442-43 (1972).
93. Although a recent report by the General Accounting Office on the efficiency of the
federal bank regulators indicates that the regulators often move too slowly in correcting major
bank problems, the report does indicate that such agencies are effective in resolving those
problems once they have been identified and that few major bankruptcies and insolvencies
have occurred. See generally Banks' Regulators Too Slow in Acting, G.A.O. Study Finds,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1977, at 37, col. 1.
94. TD-6 § 301(e). Consistent with the legislative intent underlying the 1933 Act exemption for trust funds, the Code adds to the exemptive language contained in the 1933 Act
the phrase "similar personalized fiduciary capacity," which is designed to cover banks acting
as a "conservator," as a "committee," or as a "custodian" under the Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act.
95. See RD 1-3 § 301, Note on Balance of § 301, at 45. The collective investment of
managing agency accounts is not likely to be included within the meaning of a "common trust
fund or similar fund" by the Commission or by the courts. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971).
96. RD 1-3 § 301(f); TD-1 § 301(f). The present exemptions for these interests can be
found in § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970), and in § 3(a)(12) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. V 1975).
Specific consideration should be given to exempting interests issued under a mandatory,
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Congress is not likely to change its nonexemptive policy in this area,
particularly while the Commission has ample authority under section 302 to exempt the securities conditionally or otherwise.
6. Tax-Exempt Plans. The Code retains the current exemption under the federal securities laws for an interest or participation
in a single or collective bank trust fund or in a separate account
maintained by an insurance company as the investment medium for
qualified stock-bonus, pension, annuity, and profit-sharing plans."
Similar to the bank common trust fund exemption, this exemption
applies to trustee-type funds and annuity plans when substantive
investment authority exists, but does not exempt funds and plans
that are only vehicles for direct public investment.
7. Securities Issued by Savings and Loan Associations. The
Code narrows the 1933 Act exemption for securities issued by a
savings and loan association or similar institution to securities representing an interest in a deposit account (other than capital stock
or a similar security evidencing nonwithdrawable capital) and to
securities representing a general obligation of the association ranking at least on a parity with deposit accounts. 7 The specific reference to an interest in a deposit account seems unnecessarily duplicative since the Code excludes from its definition of "security" an
interest in a deposit account with a savings and loan association. 8
Nevertheless, the exemption is similar to that provided for bank
securities9 and imposes the Code's offering statement requirements
on distributions of capital stock and similar securities in the associations when the transactions are not otherwise exempt. Since
these associations by definition must be supervised and examined
noncontributory pension plan whose administration is subject to the Employees Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1368 (Supp. V 1975), in order to correct the
unsettled state of the law created by the recent decision in Daniel v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,141 (7th Cir. 1977). The interpretative
question involved in the Daniel case also could be settled by excluding such interests from
the definition of security in § 297(b). See note 137 infra and accompanying text.
97. RD 1-3 § 301(g); see TD-1 301(i).
98. RD 1-3 § 297(b)(4). The exclusion contained in § 297(b) may be broader in one
respect because it does not contain the language of § 301(g) specifically stating that permanent stock, guaranty stock, permanent reserve stock, or a similar security evidencing nonwithdrawable capital are not exempted. Such interests are not subject to the antifraud provisions of the Code because they occur within an exclusion to the definition of a security.
99. While the Code excludes from the definition of "security" bank certificates of deposit ranking on a parity with interests in bank deposit accounts, no such exclusion is provided for certificates of deposit issued by savings and loan associations. The latter certificates are subject to the Code's antifraud provisions but are exempted by § 301(g)(2) from
the offering statement provisions. See RD 1-3 § 301(g), Note.
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by federal or state authorities, 00 the exemption is supported by the
policy considerations underlying the limited bank exemption in section 301(d).
8. Securities Issued by IndustrialBanks. The Code provides
an exemption not presently found under the federal securities laws
for securities issued by industrial banks, industrial loan companies,
or Morris Plan banks. The institutions must be supervised and examined by state officials or agencies, and the issued securities must
be in substance thrift or investment certificates, passbooks, or other
instruments evidencing the general obligation of the issuer to repay
money loaned to it. ' These institutions are neither banks nor savings and loan associations as defined under the existing federal securities laws. Thus their certificates representing deposits are not
specifically exempted despite the similarity of these securities to
102
deposit accounts in banks and in savings and loan associations.
The institutions are supervised and regulated in many states by the
same authorities who supervise and regulate state banks and savings and loan associations. Since few problems have arisen with
these institutions, only negligible public interest would be served by
subjecting their securities to the Code's offering statement requirements despite the lack of federal insurance for the certificates issued
and the lack of consistent state regulation, particularly with respect
to disclosure.
9. CertainIndenture Securities. The Code continues the exemption provided in the 1933 Act and in the Trust Indenture Act
for securities issued under mortgage indentures and insured under
03
the National Housing Act.'
10. Securities Issued by Cooperatives. Section 301(j) exempts
securities issued by three different types of cooperatives. First, securities issued by certain farmers' cooperative associations are exempt if the security is part of a class issuable only to persons dealing
in commodities with or obtaining services from the association and
is transferable by sale only to these persons or to the association.
Following the approach of the 1934 Act, the determination of exempt associations is made by reference to the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, the effect of which is to exclude almost all true
100. RD 1-3 § 296; TD-1 § 296.
101. RD 1-3 § 301(h).
102. Few if any industrial banks have registered their thrift certificates or investment
certificates in reliance principally upon the intrastate exemption.
103. RD 1-3 § 301(i); see TD-1 § 301(0). The current exemption is found in § 304(a)(5)
of the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(5) (1970).
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agricultural cooperatives. 0 The restrictions on transferability and
the antifraud provisions of the Code afford sufficient protection of
the public interest to eliminate the need for extending the exemption beyond simple membership interests to include patronage refund certificates and debt securities issued to members and patrons.0 5 A broader exemption eliminating the restrictions on transferability and permitting sales to anyone, whether member, patron,
or neither, is inherently hazardous and unnecessary as a matter of
policy.
The second type of cooperative security exempted by the section are those issued by a consumer cooperative that deals in commodities or supplies related services for the benefit of its members.
The security must satisfy the conditions prescribed for farmers' cooperatives, and dividends, other than patronage refunds, must not
be payable to security holders. Although the 1933 Act contains no
similar provisions, a similar exemption is provided in the 1934
Act. 06
Securities issued by cooperative housing corporations described
in section 216(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code' also are exempted under the Code if the corporation's activities are limited to
the ownership, leasing, management, or construction of residential
properties for its members. This exemption parallels that provided
by rule 235 under the 1933 Act but removes the rule's $300,000
aggregate offering price restriction.
11. SecuritiesIssued by Nonprofit Companies. The Code continues the exemption available under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts
for securities issued by a nonprofit company and defines the term
"nonprofit company" in substantially the same manner. The Code's
104. The 1933 Act exemption for farmers' cooperative associations in § 3(a)(5)(B), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(5)(B), is based on the Internal Revenue Code, but the criteria used for tax
purposes is deemed by the Code's draftsmen to be irrelevant for the purpose of securities
regulation. The definition in the Agricultural Marketing Act, § 12, 12 U.S.C. § 1141j(a)
(1970), includes only securities of agricultural cooperatives that (i) operate for the mutual
economic benefit of their farmer members, (ii) are primarily engaged in marketing farm
products or furnishing farm supplies or farm business services, and (iii) permit only one vote
for each member or limit dividends on stock or membership capital to 8% annually. See RD
1-3 § 301(j), Note (2)(b).
105. See RD 1-3 § 301(j), Note (2)(c).
106. 1934 Act § 12(g)(2)(F), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(F) (1970).
107. Section 216(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code defines "cooperative housing corporation" as a corporation with only one class of outstanding stock entitling each holder,
solely by reason of owning the stock, to occupy a house or apartment owned or leased by the
corporation. Additionally, no stockholder of the corporation may receive any distributions
other than the earnings and profits of the corporation except upon complete or partial liquidation of the corporation.
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definition, however, permits the Commission to restrict by rule the
ability of a promoter to profit from activity associated with the
financing or the organization of the nonprofit company.'"" In view
of the narrow administrative and judicial interpretations of the
present exemption, the general power of the Commission to define
terms, and the availability of the Code's antifraud provisions, the
necessity for including specific authority to regulate promoter's
profits is questionable. The authority may negate by inference present interpretative restrictions on promoter's profits and may result
in a rule restricting the fund-raising ability of charitable organizations whose financing programs need to be promoted.
12. Commercial Paper. Certain short-term promissory notes
and similar instruments, commonly referred to as commercial
paper, are exempted from the registration provisions of the 1933 Act
and are excluded from the definition of a security under the 1934
Act. The difference in the two approaches results in the exclusion
of commercial paper from the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act
but not from those of the 1933 Act. The Code follows the approach
of the 1933 Act, although it modifies significantly the substantive
elements of the 1933 Act exemption.
The exemption provided by section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act has
been interpreted to apply "only to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general
public, that is, paper issued to facilitate well-recognized types of
current operational business requirements and of a type eligible for
discounting by Federal Reserve banks."'0 9 In effect this interpretation limits application of the exemption to commercial paper sold
privately in large minimum denominations to institutions or sophisticated individuals by financially sound issuers. Additionally, the
1933 Act requires that the commercial paper arise out of a current
transaction or have its proceeds used for such a transaction and
108. RD 1-3 §§ 301(k), 264; TD-1 §§ 301(m), 264. These sections are based upon §
3(a)(4) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (1970), and § 12(g)(2)(D) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(D) (1970). In essence, the company must be organized and operated
exclusively for charitable, educational, religious, or social purposes or as a chamber of commerce or trade or professional association. No portion of the company's net earnings may
inure to the benefit of any person.
109. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
2045. The interpretations set forth in this release are based upon the congressional reports
issued in connection with consideration of the exemption at the time of its passage. The
release ignores the fact that Congress specifically deleted wording in the exemption that
would have permitted the exemption only when the commercial paper was not being offered
for sale to the public. See generally Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the
SecuritiesActs, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 362 (1972).
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must mature in not more than nine months. The latter requirement
generally has confined the exemption to paper which has a fixed
maturity, is not payable on demand, and has no automatic roll-over,
extension, or renewal provisions. The "current transactions" requirement creates numerous interpretative problems that have confused both the bar and the SEC staff; for example, what qualifies
as a "current transaction" and whether sales proceeds must be
traceable specifically to a current transaction are presently unclear." 0
The Code exempts "commercial paper with a denomination of
at least $100,000" and defines "commercial paper" as either a note
or a banker's or trade acceptance that is payable on demand or that
matures within, or is renewed for not more than nine months, exclusive of days of grace, after the date of issue or renewal."' Thus the
Code effects changes in current law primarily by imposing a
$100,000 minimum denomination, by permitting demand paper to
qualify as exempted commercial paper, and by eliminating the troublesome and antiquated "current transaction" requirement. In addition, except as may indirectly flow from the $100,000 limitation,
the express requirements of a private sale, purchaser sophistication,
prime quality, and discountability have been eliminated.
Although most of the Code changes are consistent with the
practicalities of current commercial paper markets, the $100,000
limitation will hamper a variety of issuers who in the past have
raised substantial funds with the Commission's approval through
direct sales to sophisticated individuals and institutions of commercial paper having minimum denominations ranging from $25,000 to
$50,000.112 No policy seems to justify an arbitrary increase of this
amount to $100,000, which effectively may restrict the ability of
some issuers to raise needed capital in commercial paper markets
especially when interest rates are high and money scarce. The
Code's limited offering exception would be available for sales of
lower denominations, but given the need of many companies to
110. See, e.g., Harrington, Use of the Proceeds of Commercial Paper Issued by Bank
Holding Companies, 29 Bus. LAw. 207 (1973).
111. RD 1-3 §§ 216A, 301(l); see TD-1 §§ 216A, 301(m). Section 216A also authorizes the Commission to include within the defined term any other instrument or interest of
primarily a mercantile or noninvestment character. Cf. RD 1-3 § 297(b)(3) (excluding from
the definition of "security" notes or other evidence of indebtedness issued in a mercantile
transaction).
112. A majority of all commercial paper is direct issue paper. The balance is dealer
paper, which generally is not offered in denominations lower than $100,000. See TD-1 §
301(n), Comment (3).
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borrow continuously in the commercial paper market and the integration concepts incorporated into the Code's definition of offering,
the exception may be of limited value in facilitating lower denomination sales to individuals and to nonfinancial institutional investors such as universities, pension funds, trust funds, and foreign
entities because the numerical restrictions on the limited offering
quickly may be exceeded. Presumably the $100,000 limitation is
designed to prevent broad public offerings of the commercial paper
to unsophisticated individuals who should be afforded the protection of the Code's offering statement process. That policy could be
implemented just as successfully by a lower or no denomination
requirement when the exemption is restricted to one-year registrants and limited by the prohibition against general advertising
contained in section 502(b) of the Code. In addition, the protections
of the antifraud provisions are always available. Even as drafted,
the exemption does not restrict the number or type of investors to
whom the commercial paper may be sold. Presumably a public
offering of the paper could occur in spite of the $100,000 limitation
if groups of individuals were solicited to purchase a single largedenomination note through a to-be-formed organization or entity,
a trustee, or some nominee.
13. Securities Issued in Connection with Bankruptcies and
Railroad Modifications.Section 301(m) of the Code is similar to the
section 3(a)(7) exemption provided by the 1933 Act for certificates
issued with court approval by a receiver or by a trustee in bankruptcy. In addition, the Code exemption incorporates without substantive change the exemptions currently available under the Federal Bankruptcy Act for any security issued with court approval by
a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or debtor in possession and for a
certificate of deposit issued by a committee under the Bankruptcy
Act that represents a security of or claim against a debtor."' Certificates of deposit issued by a committee in connection with a railroad
modification under the Interstate Commerce Act continue to be
exempted under the Code."' These securities currently are not exempted from the provisions of the 1934 Act.
14. Securities Exempted by Rule or Order. Section 302 of the
Code provides broad authority for the Commission by rule or order
to exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class of per113. Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(f)(3), 77(0(4), 264(a)(1), 393(a)(1), 518(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. §§
205(f)(3), 205(f)(4), 664(a)(1), 793(a)(1), 918(a)(1) (1970). See also note 127 infra and accompanying text.
114. Interstate Commerce Act § 20(b)(11), 49 U.S.C. § 20(b)(11) (1970).
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sons, securities, or transactions from any or all of the provisions of
the Code with certain special exceptions. Under this section the
Commission may apply retroactively any exemptive rule or order
that it is authorized or required to adopt and may impose any conditions upon the rule or order."'
The wisdom of granting broad authority to the Commission has
been discussed intensely by those who have examined the Code.1 ,
While the grant avoids artificial limitations on the Commission's
exemptive authority, as was the result of section 3(b) of the 1933
Act, and in addition provides the flexibility necessary in a Code that
encompasses many diverse areas of concern, concern is raised by the
grant since the Commission does have statutory authority that in
good faith can be misapplied. Nevertheless, since one can assume
that the Commission's exemptive authority (in contrast to its
authority to restrict or condition statutory exemptions) will be used
only sparingly, the provision's benefits outweigh the negatives
arising from any conjectured misuse.
V.

EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS

The offering or distribution statement filing requirements of
the Code generally must be complied with for the distribution of a
nonexempted security unless the transaction falls within an exemption provided by sections 511 or 512 of the Code or unless it is a local
distribution under section 513. The exemptions provided by sections
511 and 512 are true transactional exemptions. Any subsequent distribution of a security purchased in an exempted transaction must
comply with the offering or distribution statement provisions unless
otherwise exempt. Moreover, the antifraud provisions of the Code
apply to all exempted transactions. The Code provides for the following transaction exemptions.
1. Sales to Underwriters. Section 511(a) of the Code exempts
any transaction incident to an offer or sale to an underwriter. The
exemption is derived from the exclusion of preliminary negotiations
or agreements between and among underwriters and issuers from
the definitions of "offer" and "sale" in section 2(3) of the 1933 Act.
The 1933 Act exclusion reflects the practical necessity for an
issuer to be able to discuss and firm up a proposed offering with
underwriters prior to commiting itself to the large expenditures of
115. TD-5 § 302. A bank regulator, to the extent that it is the appropriate regulatory
agency, has substantially the same authority as the Commission under this section.
116. See, e.g., 49 ALI PROCEEDiNGS 411-14 (1972).
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time and money involved in preparing and filing a registration
statement. The exclusion was drafted carefully to apply only to
negotiations and agreements with underwriters, thereby prohibiting
the formation of the selling group and offers of securities to dealers
until the registration statement is filed.
The Code's exemption seeks to accomplish the same objectives
as the 1933 Act exclusion. According to the comments, however, the
exemption is cast as a transaction exemption rather than as a definitional exclusion in order that an underwriter acting as a buyer will
11 7
be entitled to the benefit of the antifraud provisions of the Code.
Since an underwriter-buyer currently has antifraud remedies under
the 1934 Act, this change in form is unlikely to have any major
ramifications. The only substantive problem arises from the use of
the undefined term "transaction." A certain interpretive gloss currently surrounds the terms "preliminary negotiations" and
"agreements," and the shift to the term "transaction" may result
in confusion in determining which prefiling activities are to be
deemed transactions. If transaction is defined broadly, as it should
be, in order to permit the normal range of prefiling activities, the
issue is moot. If the term is defined so broadly, however, that virtually all types of activities, such as forming a selling group or
engaging in prefiling publicity, arguably could be transactions
"incident to" an offer or sale to an underwriter, then the policy
underlying the exemption clearly is frustrated. Use of a Comment
or of the 1933 Act language would help avoid such difficulties.
2. Sales by Brokers or Dealers. Following the basic pattern of
section 4(3) of the 1933 Act, the Code exempts any transaction by
a broker or a dealer but excepts from those exempt transactions the
following situations:" 8
(a) When the broker or dealer acts as an underwriter.The
Code defines "underwriter" as any person who buys from or sells
for an issuer or secondary distributor in aid of a distribution
unless that person's interest is limited to the usual and customary commission or discount from an underwriter, broker, dealer,
or secondary distributor."' Thus a broker or dealer must determine whether it is buying or selling "in aid of a distribution"
only if it is acting for an issuer or secondary distributor and is
receiving unusual compensation in connection with the transaction.
117.
118.
119.

TD-1 § 511(a), Comment.
RD 1-3 §§ 511(b), 511(c); see TD-1 §§ 511(b), 511(c).
RD 1-3 § 299.11; see TD-1 § 299.11.
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(b) When the broker or dealer sells part or all of an unsold
allotment or subscriptionas a participantin a distribution.The
ordinary trading exemption for brokers and dealers is not available under section 4(3) of the 1933 Act for a broker or dealer who
is a participant in a distribution and who engages in a transaction in securities that are part or all of an unsold allotment or
subscription of that distribution. Section 511(b)(1) of the Code
continues this exception from the exemption and subjects such
transactions to the prospectus delivery requirements of section
503. While the policy underlying the exception is sound, the
Code's language is too broad in view of the applicability of the
distribution concept to all secondary transactions. Unless the
exception is limited to distributions subject to the offering or
distribution statement requirements, it will impose unintended
limitations and investigation responsibilities upon a brokerdealer handling an ordinary secondary sale.
(c) When the transaction by the broker or dealer occurs
during a certain restrictive period. Another exception to the
Code's broker-dealer transaction exemption that parallels the
section 4(3) exemption in the 1933 Act for broker-dealer transactions applies to transactions in securities of issuers that are not
one-year registrants. The exception subjects broker-dealers engaging in these transactions to the Code's prospectus delivery
requirements for ninety days following the later of (i) the effective date of an offering statement relating to those securities or
(ii) the first day on which a security of the same class became
the subject of a distribution covered by the offering statement.
The exception also applies to transactions occuring within
ninety days after the first date on which a security of the same
class was offered in violation of the Code's offering or distribution statement requirements. Thus the Code continues the 1933
Act's policy of subjecting both participating and nonparticipating broker-dealers to its prospectus delivery requirements for a
ninety-day period when an offering statement is filed or when an
unlawful distribution to the public commences involving securities of an issuer that is not a one-year registrant. To enable a
broker or dealer to comply with the prospectus delivery requirements, the Code requires an issuer, upon request, to provide
prospectuses without charge to brokers and dealers during the
restrictive period.2 0
120. RD 1-3 § 504(c); TD-1 § 504(c). The Commission has promulgated rule 15c2-8
under the 1934 Act to ensure the adequate supply of prospectuses necessary for broker and
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Under the 1933 Act the Commission has the authority to
shorten the ninety-day period by rule or order, and the Code
extends this authority to the unlawful distribution situation.
Under the 1933 Act the Commission used its authority to eliminate the restrictive period for 1934 Act reporting companies, 12
an unnecessary step under the Code since section 511(c) specifically excludes the securities of a one-year registrant from the
122
exception to the broker-dealer exemption.
When the transaction involves securities of a company that
is not a one-year registrant, the Code applies a fungibility concept that extends the prospectus delivery requirements during
the restrictive period to transactions in securities of the same
class as those that are the subject of an offering statement, even
if the securities being sold are not traceable to the offering state23
ment.
(d) When the broker or dealer sells continuously offered
registered investment company securities. Section 511(b)(3)
removes from the general broker-dealer exemption transactions
in "continuously offered securities issued by a registered investment company and currently being offered or sold by the issuer
or by or through an underwriter" except as the SEC may prescribe by rule. Section 24(d) of the Investment Company Act
currently excludes from the section 4(3) exemption of the 1933
Act transactions in the securities of investment companies that
currently are being offered or sold to the public in nonexempt
distributions, thereby requiring broker-dealers to use prospectuses in offering and selling these securities if the investment
company continues to offer or sell securities of the same class in
nonexempt distributions. The Commission is, however, authorized to modify that exclusion by rule. Section 511(b)(3) of the
Code continues this exception, which applies even to exempted
distributions of "continuously offered" securities. The section's
use of the term "continuously offered," however, may create new
interpretative problems unnecessarily.
dealer compliance with the 1933 Act delivery requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1976).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1976).
122. Section 511(c) of the Code exempts "a transaction in a security of a one-year
registrant that would be exempted under section 511(b) except for clause (2) of that section."
RD 1-3 § 511(c), TD-1 § 511(c). Section 511(b)(2) imposes the restrictive 90-day period during
which transactions by brokers or dealers are not exempted. RD 1-3 § 511(b)(2); TD-1 §
511(b)(2).
123. TD-1 § 511(b), Comment (3).
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3. Small Offerings. Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act grants the
Commission authority to exempt by rules and regulations any class
of securities if it finds that registration is unnecessary for the protection of investors because of "the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering." The Commission's authority
under that section, however, is limited to situations in which the
aggregate amount of the issue offered to the public does not exceed
$500,000. The Commission has promulgated, among other rules,
Regulation A and rule 240. Regulation A exempts an interstate public offering by an issuer of up to an aggregate amount of $500,000 in
a twelve-month period if the issuer first has filed with the Commission a notification and offering circular. The exemption is in reality
a limited form of registration. Recognizing the effects of inflation
and the need to broaden available means of raising equity capital,
former SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills has suggested that the
Regulation A exemption be simplified and its dollar limits increased
to one million dollars, changes that would necessitate an amendment to section 3(b).124 Rule 240, adopted in 1975 to increase the
ability of "Mom and Pop" issuers to raise equity capital, exempts
the sale of securities by an issuer other than an investment company
for an aggregate amount of up to $100,000 within any twelve-month
period if its securities are held by fewer than one hundred beneficial
owners both before and after any transaction in reliance on the rule
and if notice of the sale (Form 240) is filed in a regional office of the
Commission.
No Code provisions specifically parallel the provisions of Regulation A and rule 240. Section 511(d) of the Code, however, expressly
exempts a "transaction incident to an offering of not more than
$100,000" except (a) when the transaction involves a security that
is subject to the applicable resale restrictive period of the limited
offering exception or (b) when the Commission has acted by rule to
reduce the exempted amount to not less than $50,000 in any twelvemonth period, to impose conditions, or to withdraw the exemption
when the offering exceeds $50,000. In addition, the Commission,
pursuant to the broad exemptive authority contained in section 302,
may exceed the $100,000 maximum limitation of section 511(d).
Thus until the Commission acts by rule, issuers and secondary distributors have available an unqualified automatic exemption for
interstate public offerings of up to $100,000. This is normally the
124. A Report from the SEC, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,339 (Dec. 5, 1975) (address
by Chairman Hills before the Securities Industry Association).
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only exemption, other than the limited offering exception and the
local distribution exemption, under which the "Mom and Pop" corporation can raise equity capital without registration. Additionally,
under section 302 the Commission by rule may adopt other exemptions, including a successor to Regulation A, and this authority is
not limited by dollar amounts.
The exemption reflects a genuine need to relieve issuers and
secondary sellers of small offerings from the expense and complication of federal registration. The only major problem relates to the
Commission's ability to reduce or to restrict the amount of the
exemption and thus to frustrate the financing needs of small businesses. On the other hand, the Commission should have the ability
to restrict or to remove the exemption when a high potential exists
for abuse. The compromise reached by the Code permits reduction
of the exempted amount to $50,000 during a twelve-month period
and authorizes the imposition of restrictions upon or withdrawal of
the exemption only if the offering exceeds $50,000.155 Given the de
minimis effect of such small offerings, the increasing effectiveness
of blue sky regulation, and the general application of the Code's
antifraud provisions, the Commission's authority to limit the
amount to $50,000 in a twelve-month period and its authority to
exclude certain types of offerings from the exemption are unnecessary. The Commission can effectively control abuse through its antifraud powers and through the imposition of restrictive conditions
tailored to meet the particular problem. The Code should leave no
room for doubt that its federal machinery should not be cranked up
for small issues unless some overriding public policy considerations
so demand, and this point is made more conclusively if the Commission has less authority to modify the exemption.
Reliance upon this exemption requires careful examination of
the circumstances surrounding an offering to determine if it will be
integrated with prior sales, since the exemption cannot be used in
tandem with a limited offering or trading transaction exception
when section 267 requires integration and results in a loss of the
exemption or exception." 6
4. Judicially or Administratively Approved Transactions.
Both the 1933 Act and the Federal Bankruptcy Act 12 7 exempt the
125. Compare TD-1 § 511(d), with RD 1-3 § 511(d). See generally 49 ALI PROCEEDINGS
399-401 (1972).
126. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
127. Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(f)(1), 77(f)(2), 264(a)(2), 393(a)(2), 518(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. §§
205(f)(1), 205(f)(2), 664(a)(1), 793(a)(1), 918(a)(1) (1970).
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issuance of securities in exchange for outstanding securities, claims,
or property interests when the fairness of the terms and conditions
has been approved by some governmental and judicial authority. In
addition to being applicable to normal corporate reorganizations
and issuances of securities by public utilities, the 1933 Act exemption in section 3(a)(10) has been particularly useful in exempting
securities issued in insurance company and bank mergers that are
subject to the approval of state authorities and in class action litigation settlements when the terms and conditions are subject to the
approval of the court. The present exemptions, however, do not
apply when securities are issued solely for cash and not at least
partially in exchange for any other securities, claims, or property
interests, except any security may be issued for cash or otherwise
pursuant to a confirmed railroad organization plan under section
77(f) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Code consolidates these various exemptions into one section with only two substantive changes. First, the current, somewhat illogical restriction on the issuance of securities solely for cash
is eliminated. Secondly, the security involved in the exempted
transaction must be issued only to existing security holders or to
creditors of the issuer.'2 The latter change seemingly will result in
rendering the exemption unavailable in merger transactions when
the fairness of the terms is appropriately approved but the issuance
is to security holders of the to-be-acquired company rather than to
the existing security holders of the issuer. This change is justifiable
because the protection of investors may not be the agency's primary
consideration in approving the merger and because the shareholders
of the acquired company generally need the protection afforded by
the filing of an offering statement. More importantly, this change
is likely to affect the ability of a company in a reorganization to
attract equity capital from fresh sources, although from the investor's viewpoint it is not unreasonable to subject such sales to the
offering statement requirements of the Code.
5. Exercise of Rights, Conversion Privileges, and Nonconversion Exchanges. Section 3(a) (9) of the 1933 Act exempts on a transaction basis only securities exchanged by an issuer with its existing
shareholders exclusively when no commission or other remuneration is involved. This section was enacted to allow companies to
make certain voluntary readjustments of their financial obligations
128. TD-4 § 511(e); RD 1-3 § 511(e); TD-1 § 511(e). The exemption excludes debt
securities to whose distribution the offering statement requirements of the Code's successor provisions to the Trust Indenture Act apply. See note 74 supra.
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a
and encompasses only bona fide exchanges that are not a part of1 29
scheme to avoid the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
Since the securities must be "exchanged exclusively" for those held
by existing shareholders, no cash payment by the exchanging shareholders is permitted except as allowed by rule 149 under the 1933
Act. Rule 149 permits shareholders to pay cash to effect.an equitable
adjustment of dividends or of interest paid or payable on the securities involved in the exchange. Similarly, the issuer may not pay any
cash to the exchanging shareholders unless such payments are part
of the terms of the exchange within the meaning of rule 150. This
narrow exemption raises a number of difficult questions, many of
which relate to warrants and convertible securities."'
The exemptions provided by sections 511(f) and 511(g) of the
Code generally are based upon the policies underlying section
3(a) (9) of the 1933 Act but make several substantive changes. First,
the Code's exemptions apply only to transactions in securities of a
one-year registrant on the theory that if no current information
about the issuer is in the public domain, then the exchanging shareholder needs the information that would be provided by an offering
statement. While there is presumptively less reason to worry about
providing information to an existing shareholder than to an outside
investor, even when the company is not a one-year registrant, the
narrowed application of the exemption is sound, given the Code's
general scheme.
Secondly, section 511(f) of the Code treats the exercise of outstanding warrants or rights in the same manner as the exercise of
conversion privileges. Unlike section 3(a) (9), which does not exempt
such an exercise because the exercising holders ordinarily pay cash
to the issuer at the time of exercise, the Code does not restrict
payment of cash in the exercise of warrants, rights, or conversion
privileges. The only conditions to the section 511(f) exemption are
that all securities must be of the same issuer and that remuneration
must not be paid for soliciting the exercise. Although removal of the
distinction between rights calling for cash payments and those calling for surrender of securities is helpful, the exemption for the exercise of an outstanding warrant, right, or conversion privilege does
not extend to the continuing offer of the underlying security inher129. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933). See also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2136.
130. See generally TD-1 § 511(g), Comment (10). See also Hicks, Recapitalizations
under Section 3(a)(9) of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 61 VA. L. REV. 1057 (1975); McGuigan &
Aiken, Amendment of Securities, 9 REv. SEC. REG. 935 (1976).
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ent in a warrant, right, or convertible security. 3 ' Thus the practical
effect of the section 511(f) exemption is simply to remove the necessity for an issuer to keep a current prospectus over the long life of a
particular convertible security or right. Moreover, the exemption is
available only for securities of one-year registrants to ensure sufficient disclosure protection for the investor. These restrictions, particularly when combined with specific Code provisions permitting
all corporate reports to be obtained by the holders of convertible
securities or rights during the life of such rights, successfully provide
disclosure protection for the purchasers of warrants or rights. 3 '
The Code in section 511(g) more closely follows the substance
of section 3(a)(9) in connection with exchanges of securities that are
not made pursuant to an outstanding conversion privilege. The
Code imposes a condition that the buyers must not pay any consideration other than the surrender of outstanding securities, the
equalizing cash payments currently permitted by rule 149, and the
unpaid interest or accrued unpaid dividends thereon.'33 The remaining conditions to the section 511(g) exemption require, as does the
section 511(f) exemption, that there be no paid solicitation and that
all of the securities involved in the exchange be of the same issuer.
Thus exchanges involving different issuers, even if they are parent
and subsidiary, are not covered by the exemption; a current prospectus must be delivered unless the exchange is otherwise exempt.
Given the limitations on the exemption that ensure the availability
of public information, exclusion of exchanges involving related companies is needlessly restrictive, particularly when no cash is paid.
Moreover, exemption of exchanges involving unrelated companies is
consistent with the Code's disclosure approach if both companies
are one-year registrants.
An additional change in existing law relates to nonconversion
exchanges and abandons the "exclusively-in-exchange" condition
contained in the section 3(a) (9) exemption. Through the application
of integration concepts to an issue, the condition in section 3(a)(9)
131. Section 293(d) of the Code states that an offer or sale of a convertible security or
right is also an offer of the underlying security regardless of whether the right to convert or
acquire is exercisable immediately or only in the future. RD 1-3 § 293(d). Thus unless otherwise exempt, the underlying security must be included in an offering or distribution statement. See TD-1 § 511(g), Comment (10).
132. RD 1-3 §§ 601(a)(2), 601(d); see TD-1 §§ 601(a), 601(d).
133. The interest and dividend exclusion settles the question under the § 3(a)(9) exemption whether the waiver by some security holders of unpaid interest payments or accrued
dividends violates the prohibition against giving other consideration. See TD-1 § 511(g),
Comment (5).

19771

EXEMPTIONS

effectively eliminates reliance on the exemption when, as part of the
same financing plan, a simultaneous offering of securities for cash
occurs. Under the Code, the exchange is exempt as a separate transaction, and no offering statement is required if the concurrent cash
offering is not a distribution or is otherwise exempt.'34
6. Put and Call Options. The 1933 Act does not contain an
exemption for puts and calls. For many years, however, the Commission did not require the registration of put and call options under
the 1933 Act, although generally they were considered subject to the
fraud provisions and in some instances to the broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal securities laws. With the increased
trading activity in the option markets and the advent of the Chicago
Board of Options Exchange (CBOE), the staff began to treat these
options as securities that must be registered under the 1933 Act.
Recognizing the historical pattern of no registration, however, the
Commission in 1973 proposed rule 238 to exempt from registration
put and call options, other than limited price options and options
written on the CBOE, if gross proceeds from all related options did
not exceed $500,000.135 Proposed rule 238 has not been adopted to
date, and no exemption exists under the 1933 Act. General enforcement of the registration provisions, however, has not occurred.
Section 511(h) of the Code specifically exempts transactions in
puts, calls, and similar options or privileges and in the guaranties
of these options if neither the issuer of the option or privilege nor
any guarantor thereof is the issuer of the underlying security or in a
control relationship with that issuer. The Commission, however, is
granted authority to condition or withdraw the exemption by rule
with respect to any or all classes of issuers, securities, or offerings.
Thus the Code reflects present practice in this complex and fastdeveloping area but appropriately leaves the ultimate burden of
setting the parameters of the exemption to the Commission.
7. Transactions Between Exchange Members and Dealers.
Rule 153 under the 1933 Act relieves a selling broker-dealer from any
134. TD-1 § 511(g), Comment (6). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug.
8, 1939), 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2140.
135. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5366 (Feb. 8, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder],
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,222. The proposed rule was revised in December 1973. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973) [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,602. At the same time the Commission proposed rule 9b-2 under the 1934
Act requiring broker-dealers to furnish customers with written disclosure statements explaining the nature and risk of the options and to provide a reasonable basis for believing that the
recommended transaction would be suitable for the customer. See generally Frankhauser,
Options Regulations, 7 REv. SEC. REG. 887 (1974).
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applicable prospectus delivery requirements for transactions effected on a national securities exchange if the issuer or underwriter
has provided the exchange with sufficient copies of the prospectus.
The rule is designed to ease secondary trading on exchanges by
removing technical prospectus delivery requirements and at the
same time to ensure that the exchange has sufficient copies to deliver to selling broker-dealers that request them.
Section 512 of the Code continues and expands the substance
of rule 153 by exempting from the Code's prospectus delivery requirements transactions between members on the floor of a national
securities exchange and between dealers if at least one of the dealers
quotes the security in an inter-dealer quotation system. As is true
under rule 153, the exemption under the Code does not extend to
an offer or sale by a member or dealer to its customer. Therefore a
buyer's broker must comply with any prospectus delivery requirements applicable to the buyer when the broker solicits the buy order
and executes it through an exchange.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS METHODS OF AVOIDING CODE FILING
REQUIREMENTS

In addition to specific exemptions, the Code provides other
methods of avoiding its various filing provisions. In order for the
Code's prospectus provisions to be applicable, an issuer or secondary distributor must use the requisite jurisdictional means in
connection with an offer or sale of a security. If any of the requisite
elements is missing from the transaction, then the transaction is not
subject to the Code's offering or distribution statement requirements. Each of these methods of escape is quite restricted and only
rarely may be confidently relied upon.
1. Lack of JurisdictionalMeans. A securities transaction is
subject to the federal securities laws if appropriate jurisdictional
means are employed to effect the transaction. Securities transactions, however, seldom escape coverage due to a lack of jurisdictional means, given the judicial gloss imposed upon the statutory
language which creates a broad jurisdictional base. The Code broadens the existing jurisdictional base to the greatest extent possible
under current constitutional interpretations. Under the Code, a jurisdictional base exists (a) if in doing business generally or if in any
aspect of the transaction from the initial offering through payment
and delivery, there is any use of the mails or federal commerce,
which is defined as including the making of an intrastate phone call
or (b) regardless of the use .of the mails or federal 'commerce if the
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actor is involved in a business affecting federal commerce or has a
class of securities traded by use of the mails or federal commerce. 3 '
2. TransactionsNot Involving a Security. If a transaction uses
the requisite jurisdictional means but does not involve a "security,"
the Code's offering or distribution statement provisions do not
apply. Section 297 of the Code defines "security" very broadly and
contains only a few changes from and clarifications of the definition
contained in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. The Code expands the
1933 Act definition only by including puts (a right to sell) and
continues the Act's flexibility by retaining the broadly interpreted
term "investment contract." Moreover, the introduction to the definitional portion of the Code states in terms similar to those used
in the 1933 Act that definitions apply "unless the context otherwise
requires," and thus enables courts to separate investment instruments from bona fide commercial instruments even when specific
definitional language includes or excludes the instrument.
Despite the breadth of the definition of a "security," section
297(b) specifically excludes the following instruments from the
basic definition: currency; checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or bank
letters of credit; notes or other evidences of indebtedness issued in
mercantile transactions; interests in bank or savings and loan association deposit accounts; bank certificates of deposit; traditional
insurance policies; and annuity contracts issued by an insurance
company other than investment-based variable annuities. These
exclusions are designed principally to settle various interpretative
questions that have arisen under the 1933 Act. Several recent cases,
for example, have struggled with the issue of whether certain promissory notes are securities within the 1933 and 1934 Acts; 37 the Code
resolves the issue by excluding notes issued in mercantile transactions. The "context" language contained in the introduction of the
definitional portion of the Code should be sufficient protection to
ensure that the exclusions will not be misused. Exclusion of an
instrument from the definition of security is of greater significance
than classification as an exempted security, because the exclusion
removes the instrument not only from the filing provisions of the
Code but also from its antifraud provisions.
3. No Offer or Sale. Even if a security is involved, the transac136. TD-5 § 1601; see RD 1-3 § 1601; TD-3 § 1601; RD 1-3 § 234B; TD-3 § 234B.
137. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche, Ross & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,614 (2d Cir. 1976); Emisco Indus. Inc. v. Pro's Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,761 (7th Cir. 1976); Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252
(9th Cir. 1976).
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tion is not subject to the offering or distribution statement requirements of the Code if it does not involve a sale or offer. The terms
"sale and offer" are defined by section 293 of the Code in a broad
sense much as they are presently defined by section 2(3) of the 1933
Act. They include every attempt to dispose of, every solicitation of
an offer to buy, and every disposition for value and contract to sell
or of sale. The Code, however, slightly expands certain points and
codifies several interpretations that have developed over the years.
Under the Code, for example, any offer or sale of a convertible
security is considered an offer or sale of the underlying security;
under the 1933 Act there is no offer or sale when the right to convert
cannot be exercised until some future date. 38 In addition, the Code
acts to shut the door on the old "shell company" game by specifically including within the definition of "sale and offer" the payment
of a dividend in a security of another company unless the other
company is a one-year registrant and nothing of value is given for
the dividend.'39 Section 293(f) codifies and broadens present interpretations relating to merger and reorganization transactions by
deeming the issuance of a security in any merger, including a shortform merger, consolidation, recapitalization, or asset acquisition to
be a sale and offer. Thus under the Code, change-of-domicile mergers and parent-subsidiary mergers are subject to the offering statement requirements unless otherwise exempted. 4 '
Section 293(g) clarifies certain troublesome areas under the
1933 Act by excluding from the definition bona fide gifts, pledges,
security loans, stock splits, and transfers by death or by termination
of a trust. A donee or pledgee who wishes to sell given or pledged
stock is considered a secondary distributor subject to the offering or
distribution statement requirements unless the transaction or security is exempted or involves no distribution. The actual gift or
138. RD 1-3 § 293(d); TD-1 § 293(d).
139. RD 1-3 § 293(f)(4); see TD-2 § 293(f)(4); TD-1 § 293(f)(2). The "shell company"
game was designed to effect an instant public market for securities of a nonpublic company
without going through the registration process. By entering into an acquisition agreement
under which securities were exchanged for assets of nominal value with a public company
that would then distribute the shares of the nonpublic company to its public shareholders as
a dividend, the nonpublic company would obtain a public market without registration. The
Commission and the courts have indicated that these schemes are subject to the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969), 1 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
3055; SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
140. The notes to § 293 of the Code indicate that the merger of a wholly-owned subsidiary into its parent should not require an offering statement. The notes suggest that the
introductory language "unless the context otherwise requires," and the Commission's
authority to promulgate exemptions under § 302 and to define terms under § 1502 are sufficient to dispose of the problem. See RD 1-3 § 293, Note (2).
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pledge, however, is not subject to the Code's filing or fraud provisions since it is excluded from the terms "sale and offer." Thus
banks and charitable institutions will be concerned with available
resale exemptions regarding all pledged and donated securities
rather than merely with those pledged and donated by controlling
persons, as is presently the case.
VII.

CONCLUSION

New legislation frequently is scrutinized more carefully for
means of avoiding its provisions than for means of complying with
its requirements. Because the burdens and expenses imposed upon
registered companies are substantial especially in connection with
the raising of capital through nonexempt distributions, most practitioners will devote substantial attention to the exemptive provisions
of the Federal Securities Code. This is particularly so, since the
Code abandons the "control" concept of the 1933 Act and requires
that all sales by individuals fit within an exception or exemption or
be made by an effective offering statement, which a secondary seller
may demand or which a seller may provide by filing a distribution
statement.
Ordinary small businesses engaged in the process of raising
capital generally can avoid the Code's provisions only by making a
limited offering or a local distribution or by selling less than
$100,000 (or the maximum amount the Commission adopts by rule).
Secondary sellers also generally can avoid the filing requirements by
relying upon these exceptions and exemptions. Additionally, secondary sellers may rely upon the trading transaction exception,
which is unavailable to issuers. Although these exceptions and exemptions generally are not as complex and ambiguous as their counterparts under the 1933 Act, each is subject to complication or constriction by the Commission.
The Code reforms many of the exemptive provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts and significantly clarifies the interpretations given
them since their enactment. The broad authority granted the Commission to modify existing and to add new conditions relating to
those Code exemptions and exceptions that most often will be relied
upon by small businesses and ordinary investors, however, threatens the order and objectivity the Code otherwise would achieve.
Since the general rulemaking provisions of Code section 1502 provide sufficient flexibility for the Commission to meet changing conditions and demands, elimination of the specific authority to add
to and to modify the conditions to these important exceptions and
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exemptions should be considered.
With the possible exception of the soft spot created by the
breadth of Commission authority, the practitioner examining the
routes of escape under the Code should be pleased generally with
the changes effected by the Code. The federal system of securities
regulation, and the life of the securities practitioner, will be vastly
improved under the Code and thus Congress should act expeditiously to enact the Code.
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